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ABSTRACT

When a patent owner alleges another infringed the patent, the owner inevitably also
alleges that such infringement is willful. An accused infringer often defends a claim
of willful infringement by asserting evidence that the accused infringer reasonably
relied on the opinion of counsel. This article discusses the concept of willful
infringement and the criteria necessary for an opinion of counsel to be deemed
competent. Moreover, this article analyzes issues that arise as a consequence of
using such patent opinions, with a special focus on attorney-client privilege and
work-product immunity waiver.
Finally the practical ways to minimize the
problematic aspects of such patent opinions are addressed, with a focus on post
Knorr-Bremse Systeme FuerNutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp. and In re Echostar
Communications Corp. considerations.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent infringement litigation today often follows a prescribed path. The patent
owner first alleges that the accused infringer 1 is infringing its patents and then
inevitably claims that the accused infringer willfully infringed. 2 As a defense to
willful infringement, the accused infringer often counters by arguing a good-faith,
reasonable reliance on an opinion of counsel that addresses potential patent
infringement liability. The decisions in Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge
GmbH v. Dana Corp.,3 and In re Echostar Communications Corp.4 could potentially
lessen the dilemma faced by accused infringers: whether to obtain and produce an
opinion of counsel and waive some aspects of the applicable privilege when the scope
of the waiver is unpredictable, or instead to not obtain and/or produce an opinion of
counsel and suffer an adverse inference that such an opinion was, or would have been
unfavorable.
In eliminating the aforementioned adverse inference, the KnorrBremse decision expressly left intact the duty to exercise due care to avoid patent
infringement. 5 Therefore, a competent opinion accompanied by the testimony of
opinion counsel at trial remains an effective way to prove that an accused infringer
has discharged its duty of due care. Such opinions, although not mandatory, should
continue to play a critical role in defending against willful infringement and
protecting the accused infringer from enhanced damages of up to three times actual
damages and attorney's fees.
Opinions of counsel relate to the validity,
enforceability, and/or non-infringement of a particular patent relative to the accused
infringer's business activity. The opinions may also present an analysis of the risks,
if any, of patent infringement liability stemming from a particular business activity

* William L. LaFuze is a partner at Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P. in Houston, Texas. His principal
area of practice is intellectual property law with an emphasis on patent litigation involving oilfield
equipment, electronics, and computer-related fields. He just recently completed his term as chair of
the American Bar Association's Section of Intellectual Property Law. Michael A. Valek is an associate at Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P. with a background in biochemistry and inorganic chemistry. His
principal area of practice is patent litigation.
1 For purposes of simplicity in this paper, "accused infringer" will also refer to all potential
infringers, regardless of whether suit has been filed against such entity.
2 PatStats.org, U.S. Patent Litigation Statistics, http://www.patstats.org (last visited Mar. 1,
2007) (stating patentees won at trial on the issue of willfulness six out of the twelve times
willfulness was tried in 2000, twenty out of twenty-six times in 2001, ten out of nineteen times in
2002, fifteen out of twenty-two times in 2003, and three out of ten times in 2004).
3 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
4448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
5 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1345-46.
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and may suggest means of adapting the business activity so as to avoid liability.
This article discusses: (1) the concept of willful infringement with illustrative cases;
(2) various criteria necessary for an opinion of counsel to be deemed competent; (3)
issues that arise as a consequence of using such patent opinions, with a special focus
on attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity waiver; and (4) practical
ways to minimize the problematic aspects of such patent opinions, with a focus on
post Knorr-Bremse and In re Echostarconsiderations. This article also touches on
the Federal Circuit's recent order granting en banc consideration in the In re Seagate
matter and the potential ramifications of a decision in Seagate on the advice-ofcounsel defense to willful infringement.

I. WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT

A.

BACKGROUND

It is well settled that when "a potential infringer has actual notice of another's
patent rights, he has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether
or not he is infringing." 6 Failure to discharge this duty may result in an additional
finding of willful infringement by the trier of fact once the accused infringer is found
to have infringed.7 In order to punish the willful infringer, a finding of willful
infringement may lead to an enhancement of damages by the court of up to three
times actual damages.8 Enhanced damages for willful infringement should be
assessed only against the actual parties who are found to have willfully infringed,
since these damages are punitive. 9
Willful infringement arises "upon deliberate disregard for the property rights of
the patentee." 10 "[Tihe primary consideration is whether the infringer, acting in good
faith and upon due inquiry, had sound reason to believe that it had the right to act in
the manner that was found to be infringing ....
Thus precedent displays the
consistent theme of whether a prudent person would have had sound reason to
believe that the patent was not infringed or was invalid or unenforceable, and would
6 Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1983);

Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech Microelectronics Int'l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2001) ("When an infringer has actual notice of a patentee's rights, the infringer has an affirmative
duty of due care to avoid infringement").
7 Vulcan Eng'g Co. v. FATA Aluminum, Inc., 278 F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
8 See Crystal Semiconductor, 246 F.3d at 1361; Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826
(Fed. Cir. 1992); Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The statute,
although providing for enhanced damages of up to three times actual damages, is silent as to the
basis for such enhanced damages. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
9 See Crystal Semiconductor, 246 F.3d at 1361. Judge Dyk's dissent in Knorr-Bremse raises
interesting questions about whether the "failure to exercise due care" standard for enhancing
damages comports with Supreme Court precedent suggesting punitive damages can be awarded only
in circumstances where the conduct was reprehensible. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1350 (Dyk, J.,
dissenting) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) and BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996)).
10 Vulcan, 278 F.3d at 1378.
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be so held if litigated."11 This is a question of fact, and the finder of fact considers the
"totality of the circumstances" to determine if "clear and convincing evidence
establishes that the infringer acted in disregard of the patent, that the infringer had
no reasonable basis for believing that it had a right to engage in the infringing
acts." 12 The determination of willfulness "turns on considerations of intent, state of
mind, and culpability. 1 3 In judging the accused infringer's actions, "[tihe law of
willful infringement does not search for minimally tolerable behavior, but requires
prudent and ethical, legal and commercial actions." 14
A finding of willful
infringement depends on findings of culpable intent and deliberate or negligent
wrongdoing. 15 The patentee must show by "clear and convincing evidence that the
16
defendant acted without a reasonable belief that its action avoided infringement."
The Federal Circuit has not precisely defined the level of culpability or intent
required for a finding of willfulness; rather, the court has recognized that the
17
question is "one of degree" ranging from "accidental" to "reckless."

B. "Totalityof Circumstances"Standardfor Willful Infringement
Since willfulness is found when the accused infringer acts in disregard of a
patent, the accused infringer can defend against willful infringement by showing its
good-faith belief either that the patent was invalid or that its actions did not
infringe. 18 The correct legal standard is whether "under all the circumstances, a
reasonable person would prudently conduct himself with any confidence that a court
might hold the patent invalid or not infringed."19 "There are no hard and fast rules
regarding a finding of willfulness .... [A] number of factors enter into a willfulness

determination and, as such, the issue is properly resolved by evaluating the totality
11SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1464-65 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
12 Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc. (Strykerf1, 891 F. Supp. 751, 814 (E.D.N.Y.
1995) (quoting Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir.
1994)); see also Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 792 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Nat'l Presto Indus.,
Inc. v.West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1192 (Fed.Cir. 1996); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v.Johnson &
Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating willful infringement is a
question of fact, reviewed by the appellate courts under a clearly erroneous standard); Crystal
Semiconductor,246 F.3d at 1346 (reviewed for "substantial evidence").
" Nat'lPrestoIndus., 76 F.3d at 1192.
14 SRIIntl, 127 F.3d at 1465.
15 Biotec Biologische Naturverpackungen GmbH v. Biocorp., Inc., 249 F.3d 1341, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
16 CrystalSemiconductor,246 F.3d at 1346; see Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d
1270, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (using the variant formulation for willfulness of "clear and convincing
evidence, that the infringer acted in disregard of the infringed patent with no reasonable basis to
believe it had a right to do the acts in question."); see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1439-40 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (articulating the distinction between the
"clear and convincing evidence" standard and the "preponderance of the evidence" standard for
willful infringement cases, and ruling the "clear and convincing" standard is the proper standard to
be applied in willful infringement cases).
17 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
18 Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1580
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
1) Id.(quoting Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
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of the surrounding circumstances." 20 The court should consider exculpatory evidence
as well as evidence showing deliberate disregard of the patentee's rights. 21 Since
infringement is often not a one-time occurrence, the examination can focus on the
accused infringer's state of mind throughout the infringement, and infringement that
22
was not willful at the outset may become so over time.

C. Behavior Justifying a Willfulness Finding
To willfully infringe, a party must have notice of a patent. The accused infringer
should timely seek legal advice after receiving actual notice of another's patent, but
what constitutes "actual notice" of the patent to the accused infringer? The courts
have found various events constituting actual notice. Such events include the offer of
a license.2 3 Actual notice of the patent also occurs when the patentee files suit
against the accused infringer. 24 It is difficult to predict what other circumstances
25
might constitute sufficient notice: notice in trade journals was insufficient;
observance of devices marked with the patent number at a trade show, distribution of
literature referring to patented products, and correspondence with the accused
infringer about incorporation of patented devices in the accused product were held
sufficient; 26 imputation of actual notice to the corporation under agency principles
(i.e., from officers, directors, or subsidiaries) is possible;27 observation by the accused
infringer of a patent notice and drawing in the Official Gazette is sufficient;28 a
conversation with a third party about the patent may be sufficient; 29 learning of a
patent through an internal patent search is sufficient;30 awareness of pending patent
rights may be sufficient; 31 and knowledge about foreign counterparts to a U.S. patent
32
application may be sufficient.
While knowledge of a patent and failure to exercise due care to avoid
infringement form the overarching framework for willful infringement, copying is
20 Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 792 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
21 Comark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
22 Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1221-22 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

2:3Leinoff v. Louis Milona & Sons, Inc., 726 F.2d 734, 743 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating the offer of a
license provided sufficient notice); Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1577 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) ("The offering of a license is actual notice.").
24 Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
25 MacPike v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1526, 1531 (N.D. Fla. 1993) (finding
advertisements in trade journals insufficient to constitute notice); Torin Corp. v. Philips Indus., Inc.,
625 F. Supp. 1077, 1087 n.1 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (finding mention of patent in widely circulated trade
journals insufficient to constitute notice).
26 Imonex Servs., Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GmbH, 408 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
27 Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
28 Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc. (Stryker 71i), 96 F.3d 1409, 1415 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
29 Jepson, Inc. v. Makita USA Inc., 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1107, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
30 Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Med. Eng'g Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1370, 1396 (E.D. Wis. 1992), affd
in part,rev'din partand remanded 6 F.3d 1523 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
31 Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1566-67; Exxon Chem. Patents,
Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1871, 1872-73 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
32 Lubrizol, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1872-73.

[6:313 2007]

Exculpatory Patent Opinions and Privilege

perhaps the most common hallmark of willful infringement. For example, in Pacific
Furniture Manufacturing Co. v. Preview Furniture Corp.,33 the court found
willfulness because the patented and accused devices were virtually identical, the
accused infringer stated that he was "not proud of what he had done," and that sales
of the copied device "would be limited to certain markets," and the opinion of counsel
relied upon was not supported by an examination of underlying evidence (i.e., file
histories of the patents at issue). 34 However, the Federal Circuit has made it clear
that "slavish copying" is not required-the proper inquiry is whether the accused
infringer sought to deliberately copy the ideas or designs of another. 35 On the other
hand, a mitigating factor may be proof that the accused infringer was attempting to
design around the patented product, even though it produced a similar, but nonidentical device. 36 Filing a patent application on the design-around attempt has been
found to give rise to an inference of an intent not to infringe, even when infringement
is finally found. 37 Research into a competitor's machine that can be framed as
examining for areas of potential improvement has been found to be evidence of non38
willfulness.
Unfair competition or inducement of breaches of confidentiality, such as hiring
away a key employee of the patentee to direct duplication of the patentee's activities,
has led to a willfulness finding. 39 Misappropriation of trade secrets, prior issuance of
a patent that covers the trade secret technology, and the subsequent attempt to
40
patent the misappropriated technology are evidence of willful infringement.
Additionally, concealment or misrepresentation as to activities, failure to keep or
deliberate destruction of records relating to infringement and damages, and the
prolongation of litigation despite clear evidence of validity and infringement have
also led to findings of willfulness. 41 The court found willful infringement when the
accused infringer ignored letters offering a license and failed to study the patent or
seek advice of counsel. 42 Even pre-issuance warnings that a patent is pending can
43
serve as a basis for a willfulness finding.
'33
626 F. Supp. 667 (M.D.N.C. 1985), affd, 800 F.2d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
34Id.at 676-78.
35,Stryker Corp. v.Intermedies Orthopedics, Inc. (Sttryknr [), 96 F.3d 1409, 1414 (Fed.Cir.
1996); see also Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech Microelectronics Int'l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336,
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that evidence of copying supported willfulness finding); Advanced
Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding willfulness for failure
to seek opinion of counsel as to ultimately unsuccessful design-around attempt).
36 See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
37 See Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1191, 1200 (D. Mass. 1988), affd in part,rev'din
part,914 F.2d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
38 See Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
31 Cent. Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 581 F. Supp. 54, 59 (W.D. Okla. 1983), affd, 723
F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (considering the following additional factors: relying on prior art already
considered in the prosecution history as a basis for an opinion of counsel regarding invalidity, failure
to follow advice of counsel regarding non-infringement, and belief that suit would not be filed based
on the fact that the accused infringer was a large customer of the patentee).
40 Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1581-82
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
41 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03(4)(b)(iv) (1999).
42 Leinoffv. Louis Milona & Sons, 726 F.2d 734, 743 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
43See, e.g., Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., 853 F.2d 1557, 1566-67 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1871, 1872-73 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
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One important action the accused infringer can take in its defense, and one often
taken, is to obtain a competent opinion of counsel regarding the validity,
enforceability, and/or non-infringement of the patent that exculpates the accused
infringer. 44 Note that the emphasis here is on the accused infringer's good-faith
defense.
Therefore, whether the opinion is ultimately legally correct is not
determinative. 45 A party who acts with a good-faith belief that the patent is invalid
"should not have increased damage or attorney fees imposed solely because a court
46
subsequently holds that belief unfounded."
What is significant is "the nature of that opinion and what effect it had on an
infringer's actions." 47 Obtaining an opinion of counsel does not 'always and alone'
dictate a finding that the infringement was not willful." 48 In fact, there have been
cases finding willful infringement even though the accused infringer obtained an
opinion of counsel. 49 These cases "generally involve situations where opinion of
counsel was either ignored or found to be incompetent." 50 To reap the benefits of the
opinion of counsel, the accused infringer must show that it relied on the advice
contained in the opinion.5 1 The accused infringer's reliance must also be timely. 52 An
accused infringer who obtained an opinion of counsel, but waited two years after the
start of production before measuring its products to determine whether it was
infringing was "in the same position as one who failed to secure the advice of
counsel." 53 In addition, the opinion must reflect competent legal advice, with the
"emphasis here ...on 'competent' legal advice."5 4 A competent opinion is one that is
"thorough enough, as combined with other factors, to instill a belief in the infringer
that a court might reasonably hold the patent is invalid, not infringed, or
unenforceable.",,

44 See, e.g., Endress + Hauser, Inc. v. Hawk Measurement Sys. Pty. Ltd., 892 F. Supp. 1123,
1133 (S.D. Ind. 1995), aff, 122 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Comark Comme'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp.,
156 F.3d 1182, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
45Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Steelcase, Inc. v. Haworth,

Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (W.D.Mich. 1997) (citing Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785,

793 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
46 Kloster, 793 F.2d at 1581.
47Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co. (AmstodIndus. Ii), 24 F.3d 178, 182 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
48 Id. at 182 (quoting Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr, Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert &
Salzer Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1084 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); aceordMinn.
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
4) See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828-29 (Fed. Cir. 1992); AmstedIndus. 11 24
F.3d at 182-83 (holding the reliance on the opinion letter lacked a good faith belief the patent was
invalid, thereby upholding the willful infringement jury finding); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro,
Inc. (JohnsHopkins If), 152 F.3d 1342, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
5oRoad, 970 F.2d at 829.
5 Johns Hopkins I1 152 F.3d at 1364 (finding the opinions must be competent and followed).
52 Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
53Id.
54 Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1580
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
5 Johns Hopkins I, 152 F.3d at 1364 (quoting Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944
(Fed. Cir. 1992)).
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While reliance on a competent opinion of counsel may be an important defense
against willful infringement, it is not the only factor to consider. 56 A finding of
57
willfulness is based on the totality of the circumstances.
The totality of the circumstances may include not only such aspects as the
closeness or complexity of the legal and factual questions presented, but
also commercial factors that may have affected the infringer's actions.
Aspects in mitigation, such as whether there was independent invention or
attempts to design around and avoid the patent or any other factors tending
to show good faith, should be taken into account and given appropriate
58
weight.
59
There are, however, "no hard and fast rules regarding a finding of willfulness."
Rather, the totality of the circumstances must be considered to determine the issue of
willful infringement.
Likewise, while reliance on a competent opinion of counsel may be an important
defense against willful infringement, the failure to obtain competent legal advice
from counsel is not prima facie willful infringement; all of the circumstances must be
60
considered.
Even though an opinion of counsel is not mandatory in defending against an
accusation of willful infringement, it is advisable for accused infringers to obtain
such an opinion. In the past, failure to obtain an opinion of counsel or failure to
produce the opinion allowed the fact finder to draw an adverse inference that the
opinion was or would have been "contrary to the infringer's desire to initiate or
continue its use of the patentee's invention."6 1 Knorr-Bremse expressly overruled
precedent allowing for such an inference, but did not eliminate the duty of due care

56 Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
57 Jd.
5S SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
59 Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 792 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
60 Biotec Biologische Naturrerpackungen GmbH v. Biocorp, Inc., 249 F.3d 1341, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (when the defendant employed an expert in the art at issue, the jury could reasonably find no
willfulness despite defendant's failure to obtain opinion of counsel); Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Nat'l
Castings Inc. (Amsted Indus. P, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737, 1741 (N.D. Ill. 1990), affd in part, vacated in
partand remanded,24 F.3d 178 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("There is nothing talismanic in an opinion letter
which advises a party that its conduct will not infringe upon the patent in question."); Rite-Hite
Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 348, 391 (D. Del. 2002) (finding considerations regarding counsel's opinion to
be "only one factor to be weighed; it is not the end of the court's inquiry on willfulness") affd, 56 Fed.
Appx. 503 (Fed. Cir. 2003); cf Gillette Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1929, 1964
(D. Mass. 1989) (stating that offering no opinion of counsel is "extremely telling"), affd, 919 F.2d 720
(Fed. Cir. 1990). However, when the accused infringer knows about the patent but does not seek
opinion of counsel regarding infringement or validity of such patent, without other actions to
illustrate due care, and infringement is found, the court will not question a finding of willful
infringement. Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech Microelectronics Int'l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336,
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
61 Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1988); accord Wesley
Jessen,209 F. Supp. 2d at 391.
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to avoid patent infringement. 62 Therefore, obtaining a competent opinion of counsel
remains advisable to avoid a finding of willful infringement. Additional uncertainty
remains as to how the failure to produce or obtain an opinion will factor into the
totality of the circumstances test for willful infringement and how much latitude
courts will allow in presentation of evidence of the failure to obtain or produce an
opinion even if the inference is no longer supported in the law. After Knorr-Bremse,
the law very likely remains that the accused infringer who refuses to produce the
opinions and instead claims privilege until after the end of the discovery period will
63
be precluded from using the opinion as evidence at trial.
The Federal Circuit recognized the difficulty of the dilemma associated with
negative inferences for invoking attorney-client privilege. To minimize the concerns
associated with the advice-of counsel defense and waiver of privilege, the Federal
Circuit has suggested bifurcating the trial.
This issue is discussed below.
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit recently issued the Knorr-Bremse decision, a case
it sua sponte took on en banc to reconsider the adverse inference drawn when the
accused infringer fails to obtain or withholds patent opinions from discovery. The
specific questions answered by the Federal Circuit were:
1. When the attorney-client privilege and/or work product privilege is invoked by
a defendant in an infringement suit, is it appropriate for the trier of fact to draw an
adverse inference with respect to willful infringement?
2. When the defendant has not obtained legal advice, is it appropriate to draw
an adverse inference with respect to willful infringement?
3. If the court concludes that the law should be changed, and the adverse
inference withdrawn as applied to this case, what are the consequences for this case?
4. Should the existence of a substantial defense to infringement be sufficient to
defeat liability for willful infringement even if no legal advice has been secured?
The court answered questions one and two in the negative. The court justified
its answer to the first question on the basis that the distortion of the attorney-client
relationship caused by such an inference was unwarranted. 64 The court felt that risk
of liability in disclosures to and from counsel unduly intruded upon full
communication and ultimately the public interest in encouraging open and confident
relationships between client and attorney. 65 The court recognized that courts in
other areas of the law had declined to impose adverse inferences upon assertion of
the attorney-client privilege. 66 It pointed out that the "conceptual underpinnings"
that formed the justification for the adverse inference rule have been eroded in
today's era of widespread awareness of and respect for patent rights, as contrasted
with the "widespread disregard" of patent rights prevalent when the adverse
inference rule came into effect. 67 As to question two, the court apparently was
persuaded by amici curiae arguments regarding the costs and burdens associated
with obtaining an opinion. 68 Importantly, the court expressly left intact the duty of
62 Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1345-46
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
63 See Belmont Textile Mach. Co. v. Superba, S.A., 48 F. Supp. 2d 521, 523 (W.D.N.C. 1999).
64 Knorr-Brmse, 383 F.3d at 1344-45.
6 See id. at 1344.
66 Id. at 1345.
67 Id. at 1343-44.
68 Id. at 1345.
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care to avoid infringement of patents of which one is aware.6 9 The Federal Circuit
remanded on question three for reconsideration of the evidence of willfulness and an
award of attorney's fees in the absence of the adverse inference. Interestingly, the
court cited, with approval, the factors set forth in Read Corp. v. Portee, InC.70 The
Read factors go toward the consideration of whether enhanced damages are
appropriate, and in what amount, after a willfulness finding has already been made,
not to whether a finding of willfulness itself is appropriate. 71 The Federal Circuit
appeared to blur the distinction in an important way, since the Read factor regarding
the size and financial condition of the accused infringer should not have any
connection with the "intent" or willfulness of the accused infringer. The Federal
Circuit also expressly declined to rule whether the failure to consult counsel can
factor into a jury's consideration of the totality of the circumstances. 7 2 Finally, as to
question four, the Federal Circuit deemed a weighing of the totality of the
circumstances preferable to a per se rule.73
Presumably, the existence of a
substantial defense to infringement would weigh heavily in the consideration of the
totality of the circumstances.

D. Willfulness FindingIncreasesDamages

1. EnhancedDamages
Although a finding of willful infringement usually leads to enhanced damages,
enhanced damages do not automatically apply. A finding of willful infringement
"does not compel the district court to grant" enhanced damages.74 "Even where
willfulness has been found by clear and convincing evidence by a jury, the
enhancement of damages is not a foregone conclusion." 75 Rather, the decision of
76
whether to increase damages and by how much is in the discretion of the court.
Reviewing on an "abuse of discretion" standard, the Federal Circuit has upheld the
decisions of some district courts even though the court did not enhance damages after
77
a finding of willful infringement.

(9 Jd.
70 -d.

at 1346 (citing Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816-27 (Fed. Cir. 1992))
(acknowledging while there are no bright line rules with respect to willfulness, precedent dictates
the use of the Read factors).
71 See Read, 970 F.2d at 826-27.
72 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1346-47.
73 Id. at 1347.
74Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
57Atmel Corp. v. Silicon Storage Tech. Inc., 202 F. Supp.2d 1096, 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
76 See Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that
even if the jury finds willful infringement, the judge can still deny enhanced damages); SRI Int'l,
Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1468-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997); SmithKline Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1164 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
77 Odetics, 185 F.3d at 1274; Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 543 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
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If issues of infringement or patent validity are close, a "court should be 'more
reluctant to impose punitive damages.' 8 To determine whether to enhance damages
and the amount of such enhancement, if any, the court should consider the following
factors: "(1) deliberate copying; (2) infringer's investigation and good faith belief in
validity or non-infringement; (3) litigation conduct; (4) infringer's size and financial
condition; (5) closeness of the case; (6) duration of the misconduct; (7) remedial action
79
by the infringer; (8) infringer's motivation for harm; and (9) concealment."
Although some of these factors are the same as those considered by the fact finder in
deciding willfulness, the court should reweigh these factors "in greater nuance as
may affect the degree of enhancement."80 The court should "consider factors that
render defendant's conduct more culpable, as well as factors that are mitigating or
81
ameliorating."

2. Attorney's Fees for Exceptional Cases
In addition to the potential for enhanced damages, a finding of willful
infringement may lead a court to determine that the case is "exceptional."8 2 If a case
is found to be exceptional, the court may grant attorney's fees.83 However, a court is
not required to grant attorney's fees even if it finds that a case is exceptional.8 4 If a
court decides that a case involving willful infringement is not exceptional it must
explain why the case is not exceptional and not covered by the statute. 85 In Cyhor
Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.,86 the court found that the case was not exceptional
since there was only "sufficient but weak" evidence of willful infringement.8 7 In
determining whether to award attorney's fees, the court should look to factors such
as "the closeness of the case, the tactics of counsel, the conduct of the parties, and

78 Endress + Hauser, Inc. v. Hawk Measurement Sys. Pty. Ltd., 892 F. Supp. 1123, 1133 (S.D.
Ind. 1995), affd, 122 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Yoder Bros., Inc. v. Cal.-Fla. Plant Corp.,
537 F.2d 1347, 1383-84 (5th Cir. 1976)).
79 Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1377-78 (Fed.Cir. 2002); Read
Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826-27 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
80 SRIInt'l, 127 F.3d at 1469.
81Read, 970 F.2d at 826.
82 Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

(willful infringement is one type of exceptional circumstance); Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Nat'l Castings,
Inc. (Amsted Indus. Ii), 24 F.3d 178, 184 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (asserting that a case could be deemed
exceptional upon a finding of willful infringement); see also Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Invamed Inc.,
213 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding the case exceptional due to bad-faith litigation by the
patentee).
83 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006).
Other types of conduct that can lead to a finding that a case is
exceptional include inequitable conduct before the Patent and Trademark Office, misconduct during
litigation, vexatious or unjustified litigation, and frivolous suit. Invamed, 213 F.3d at 1365.
81 S.C. Johnson & Son v. CarterWallace, Inc., 781 F.2d 198, 201 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Modine Mfg.
Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 543 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138
F.3d 1448, 1460-61 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that a finding of willfulness does not mandate a finding
that the case is exceptional).
85 Carter-Wallace,781 F.2d at 201; Modine Mfg., 917 F.2d at 543.
86 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
87 Id. at 1460.
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any other factors that may contribute to a fair allocation of the burdens of litigation
'
as between winner and loser. 88
Given the large damages and attorney's fees that could result from a finding of
willful infringement, it is critical to protect against such a finding. Although
numerous factors are involved in determining whether the accused infringer willfully
infringed, "[iut is well settled that an important factor in determining whether willful
infringement has been shown is whether or not the infringer obtained the opinion of
counsel."8 9 The discussion below focuses on opinions of counsel as a defense to willful
infringement.

III.

COMPETENT OPINION OF COUNSEL

An accused infringer can discharge its duty of due care by seeking and relying
upon the competent opinion of objective counsel if the opinion is exculpatory. 90
Exercising due care to avoid infringement of another's known patent rights requires
the accused infringer to act in good faith.9 1 Did the accused infringer reasonably
believe that it was not engaging in infringing activities? 92 This duty is still intact
after Knorr-Bremse.93 When the accused infringer discharges this duty by seeking
and obtaining legal advice from counsel, the accused infringer's reasonable, goodfaith belief turns on whether the opinion is "thorough enough, as combined with
other factors, to instill a belief in the infringer that a court might reasonably hold the
94
patent is invalid, not infringed or unenforceable."
Although receiving actual notice of another's patent rights triggers the accused
infringer's duty of care, it does not require that the accused infringer immediately
stop the allegedly infringing activity. "[A] party may continue to manufacture and
may present what in good faith it believes to be a legitimate defense without risk of
being found on that basis alone a willful infringer." 95 However, if the notice received
is in the form of a suit alleging patent infringement, only obtaining counsel to defend
against the suit does not constitute due care. 96 "[D]efenses prepared for a trial are
88 Carter-Wallao, 781 F.2d at 201; acord Atmel Corp. v. Silicon Storage Tech. Inc., 202
F. Supp.2d 1096, 1108 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
89 Comark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
90 Soo Endress + Hauser, Inc. v. Hawk Measurement Sys. Pty. Ltd., 892 F. Supp. 1123, 1133
(S.D. Ind. 1995), af/d, 122 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Comark, 156 F.3d at 1191; Vulcan Eng'g Co. v.
Fata Aluminum, Inc., 278 F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Applied Telematics, Inc. v. Sprint Corp.,
No. 94CV4603, 1995 WL 567436, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 1995) ("A charge of willful infringement
can be rebutted by proof that the alleged infringer obtained a competent opinion of counsel that the
conduct complained of would not infringe the patent in question.").
91 See Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Scis., Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
92 See Cordis Corp. v. SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 980 F. Supp. 1030, 1032 (D. Minn. 1997); Ortho
Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
93 Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1345-46
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
94Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Ortho
Pharm., 959 F.2d at 944).
9 Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech Microelectronics Int'l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (quoting Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Indus. Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 508, 511 (Fed. Cir.
1990)).
96 Crystal Semiconductor, 246 F.3d at 1352.
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not equivalent to the competent legal opinion of non-infringement or invalidity which
' 97
qualify as 'due care' before undertaking any potentially infringing activity.
In assessing the competency of the opinion, objective evidence should be used. 98
Courts have looked to various factors to determine whether a patent opinion is
competent on a "totality of the circumstances" standard.9 9 Those factors are
addressed here.
To serve as exculpatory legal advice the opinion of counsel is viewed
objectively, to determine whether it was obtained in a timely manner,
whether counsel analyzed the relevant facts and explained the conclusions
in light of the applicable law, and whether the opinion warranted a
reasonable degree of certainty that the infringer had the legal right to
conduct the infringing activity. 10 0

A. Time to Obtain the Opinion of Counsel
UnderwaterDevices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.10 1 states that the affirmative
duty to exercise due care requires that the accused infringer "seek and obtain
competent legal advice from counsel before the initiation of any possible infringing
activity." 102 The Federal Circuit later clarified that seeking and obtaining competent
opinion of counsel before initiating the potentially infringing activity is required only
if the infringer already knew of the patent before it started the activity. 10 3 "Whether
an act is 'willful' is by definition a question of the actor's intent," therefore, a party
10 4
cannot, by definition, willfully infringe a product about which it has no knowledge.
Courts have found that it is not possible or required to obtain an opinion of counsel
prior to beginning alleged infringing activity if the accused infringer did not know of
the existence of the patent before it began the activity. 10 5 Willful infringement is not
possible when the patent has not issued prior to the manufacture of the infringing
product. 10 6 This should be distinguished from conduct occurring before the patent
issues as a factor in determining willful infringement. "[Allthough willfulness is
generally based on conduct that occurred after a patent issued, pre-patent conduct
10 7
may also be used to support a finding of willfulness."
Id.
Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 829 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Atmel Corp. v. Silicon Storage
Tech., Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Steelcase Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 954
F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (W.D. Mich. 1997).
9 See Comark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
100
SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
101 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
102 Id. at 1390 (emphasis added).
103 Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (explaining UnderwaterDevices as
a case where the infringer knew of the patent before the infringement).
104 Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Indus. Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 508, 510-11 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
97
98

1051
Id. at 511.
106 Id. at 510.
107 Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1581
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
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An accused infringer who does not know of a patent before commencing
potentially infringing activity meets the requirement of due care when it seeks and
obtains timely legal advice from counsel promptly after receiving actual notice of
another's patent. It has been held untimely to obtain an opinion two years after
receiving actual notice.10 8 It may also be untimely to obtain an opinion of counsel
after litigation begins. 10 9 The court in Miehlin commented that "it is difficult to
understand how there could be a defense to willful infringement based on an opinion
rendered after the litigation began." 110 It is also untimely to obtain an opinion of
counsel after the accused infringer has ceased infringement.1 11
Reasonable and prudent commercial standards may require a party to seek
competent legal advice before initiating any possibly infringing activity. The duty of
due care has required accused infringers to seek an opinion of counsel and suggested
that it is a reasonable practice to conduct a patent search before making the decision
to introduce a product or service into the market.1 12 When discussing the issue of
willfulness, a manager conceded it would be prudent in most business situations to
conduct a patent search before launching a product nationally. 113 Prior to engaging
in the selling of a product or service, the party should determine whether the
proposed business activity would infringe any issued patents or other rights of third
parties. 114 Failure to do so may factor into the determination of willfulness. 115 In
other words, failure to act according to rules of business ethics and to conduct
prudent commercial operations in accordance with the law may give rise to a finding
116
of willfulness.

B. Oral or Written Opinions
A court may look to whether the opinion is oral or written, giving less weight to
oral opinions "because they have to be proved perhaps years after the event, based
only on testimony which may be affected by faded memories and the forces of
contemporaneous litigation." 117 However, reliance on an oral opinion can satisfy an

108 Tanashin Denki Co. v. Thomson Multimedia, Inc., No. IP-99-836-C-Y/K, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14598, "19 (S.D. Ind. May 24, 2002).
109 Michlin v. Canon, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 172, 174 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
110 Id. (accused infringer using the same counsel for its opinion as well as for trial likely
factored into the comment).
111 Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 588, 607 n.13
(D. Md. 2002) (noting that such an opinion has limited relevance).
112 See Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc. (Stryker 1), 891 F. Supp. 751, 815-16
(E.D.N.Y. 1995).
113 Id.
114 Id.at 816.
115 Id.
116 See Vulcan Eng'g Co. v. FATA Aluminum, Inc., 278 F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
117 Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1580
(Fed. Cir. 1992). Soo so Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc. v. Glaverbel, S.A., 72 F. Supp. 2d 893, 914
(N.D. Ill. 1999) ([O]ral opinions are not favored."); Cabot Corp. v. Solution Tech., Inc., 122 F. Supp.
2d 599, 637 (W.D.N.C. 2000) ('Oral opinions carry less weight, partly because of problems of proof of
their content and basis."); Atmel Corp. v. Silicon Storage Tech., Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1104
(N.D. Cal. 2002).
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infringer's duty of care. 118 In Radio Steel & Manufacturing Co. v. MTD Products,
Inc.,119 the Federal Circuit found no willfulness because the accused infringer
reasonably relied on an oral opinion of counsel and made design modifications
consistent with the opinion, thereby evincing an intent to avoid infringement of the
plaintiffs patent. 120 However, the court noted that oral opinions may not suffice if
the client obtains several written opinions but acts on the basis of an "oral, almost
off-the-cuff opinion," or if the attorney is reluctant to render an oral opinion but is
"pressured or coerced into doing so by his client." 121 The fact that the opinion is oral
does not render it per se unreliable; it is merely a factor considered in determining
whether the accused infringer had a good-faith belief that it was not infringing a
valid patent.
In addition, some courts find a broader scope of privilege waiver appropriate
when opinions of counsel were given orally. 122 Materials opinion counsel considered
and evaluated in presenting an oral opinion may be helpful in determining the
substance of the opinion. 123 This is especially true when counsel who gave an oral
opinion no longer specifically remembers what information was conveyed to the
accused infringer. 124 The issue of scope of waiver is discussed in detail in Section IV
below.

C. Author of the Opinion
According to the Federal Circuit, "the competency requirement applies to both
the qualifications of the person giving the opinion and to the content of the opinion
itself."'2 5 Several considerations determine the competency of the person giving the
opinion. Courts prefer a U.S. patent attorney who is outside counsel, who is not
expected to be trial counsel for the accused infringer, and who has no interest in the
outcome of the case.

1. US. PatentAttorney Is Preferred
Whether the attorney drafting the opinion is licensed to practice patent law
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office is a consideration in
determining the competency of the opinion. The fact that opinion counsel is not a
patent attorney by itself does not answer the question of good faith, but it should be
118 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., No. IP-99-38-C-H/K, 2001 WL 1397304, at
*19 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 29, 2001) (citing Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prod., Inc. 788 F.2d 1554, 155859 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
11)788 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

120
121

Id. at 1559.
Id.

122 Frazier Indus. Co. v. Advance Storage Prods., No. 92 0303 AWT, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19888, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 1994); Matsushita Elecs. Corp. v. Loral Corp., No. 92 Civ. 5461, 1995
WL 527640, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1995).
123 Mats ushita, 1995 WL 527640, at *2.
124
Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. E'Lite Optik, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1087-88 (D. Nev. 2003).
125 Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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considered. 126 However, most courts find that "competent opinions are unlikely to
come from non-patent counsel ... or lay persons. ' 127 Willful infringement occurred
when the accused infringer "only sought the opinion of general, not patent counsel
with regard to validity and infringement of the patents." 128 The court found that the
accused infringer failed to demonstrate "that this procedure led to a good faith belief
that the patents were either invalid or not infringed." 129 The patent attorney should
be admitted to practice in the United States. Reliance on an opinion drafted by
foreign patent attorney failed to impress the court in Spindelfabrik Suessen-Sohurr,
Stahlecker &
Grill GmbH v. Schubert &
Salzer Masehinenfabrik
Aktiengesellschaft.130 Thus, an opinion drafted by a patent attorney admitted to
practice in the United States generally increases the competence of the opinion.

2. Attorney Should Not Have Any Stake in the Outcome
The fact that the attorney drafting the opinion had a financial stake in the
outcome of the case has been found to affect the objectivity of the opinion of
counsel.13 1 A district court rejected the accused infringer's arguments of good-faith
reliance on an opinion of counsel for several reasons, one of them being that the
attorney who gave the opinions had a direct financial stake in the outcome of the
patent dispute. 132 The district court recognized that "the only legal opinion [the
accused infringer] was willing to present was formulated by ... an attorney with a
stake in the outcome."133
Likewise, the question of bias arises where the attorney drafting the opinion is
"in-house" counsel, rather than "outside" counsel. The court in Minnesota Mining &
Manufacturing Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc.13 4 found that the
accused infringer "had no reasonable basis to rely on [an in-house attorney's] oral
opinion because, at a minimum, it was not objective." 135 That in-house counsel drafts
the opinion is a fact that, by itself, does not determine a lack of good faith. There is
no rule requiring outside counsel to draft the opinion; it is merely a fact to be
weighed. 13 6 "Just because an attorney is in-house counsel does not mean that his
opinions are necessarily suspect."137 Whether the opinion comes from an in-house
Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir.
Jepson, Inc. v. Makita USA, Inc., No. CV 90-4312-GHK, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
*20-21 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 1994); see also Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944
1992) (stating competent opinion letters were obtained from "experienced patent counsel").
128 Acoustical Design, Inc. v. Control Elecs. Co., 932 F.2d 939, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
129 Id.
130 829 F.2d 1075, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
131Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 366, 377
1998), affd, 231 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
126

127

1983).
21622, at
(Fed. Cir.

(S.D.N.Y.

132 Id.

1:3:3
Id.
134 976 F.2d 1559 (Fed.
135 Id. at 1580.
136 Studiengesellschaft

Cir. 1992).

Kohle, m.b.H. v. Dart Indus., Inc., 862 F.2d 1564, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir.
1988); Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1983); W.
Elec. Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 631 F.2d 333, 337 (4th Cir. 1980).
137 W. Elec., 631 F.2d at 337.
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attorney or an outside attorney may determine whether the opinion is competent and
reliable.
Conversely, the fact that outside counsel prepares the opinion is not
determinative of its independence. One court allowed discovery of information
relating to the "general nature" of the relationship between the accused infringer and
its outside counsel to determine the independence of the outside counsel from whom
the accused infringer obtained the opinion. 138 In doing so, the court allowed
discovery of the attorney's fees paid by the accused infringer to counsel, including a
showing of the percentage of total revenues that the accused infringer's work
comprised. 13 9
Therefore, independence of counsel may also be considered in
determining the competency of the opinion.

3. Attorney Should Not Be the Same as Trial Counsel
Additionally, an accused infringer should choose an attorney other than trial
counsel to draft the opinion. Retaining the same trial counsel as opinion counsel
raises the question of bias. Invalidity or non-infringement defenses prepared by trial
counsel do not qualify as competent patent opinions. In Crystal Semiconductor Corp.
v. Triteeh Microeleetronies Int, Inc.,1 40 the court explained that "defenses prepared
for a trial are not equivalent to the competent legal opinion of non-infringement or
invalidity which qualify as 'due care' before undertaking any potentially infringing
activity." 141 In addition, a jury may believe that the opinion of counsel was "written
in anticipation of litigation."'1 42 Some courts have also found that advice given by
opinion counsel who is simultaneously serving as trial counsel is biased. 143 These
considerations factor into the determination of the opinion's competence.
Problems such as disqualification of trial counsel and waiver of privilege as to
trial advice and strategies are likely to arise when opinion counsel is used as trial
counsel. Whether opinion counsel may also serve as trial counsel raises ethical
questions. This is because it is foreseeable that counsel may be called to testify as to
the opinion since the counsel who prepares the opinion is in the "best position" to
answer questions regarding the bases of the opinion.1 44 Under ABA Model Rule of
Professional Conduct Rule 3.7, "a lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which
the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness."1 45 If opinion counsel is a member of
trial counsel's law firm, the Model Rules state that a lawyer may "act as advocate in
a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a
138 Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 98C7598, 1999 WL 89570, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12,
1999).
139 Id.

140 246 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
141 Id. at 1352.
112 Therma-Tru Corp. v. Peachtree Doors Inc., 44 F.3d 988, 997 (Fed. Cir. 1995). However, it is
unclear as to whether counsel giving the opinion in this case was also the trial counsel. Id.
143 Tanashin Denki Co. v. Thomson Multimedia, Inc., No. IP-99-836-C-Y/K, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14598, at "18-19 (S.D. Ind. May 24, 2002).
144 Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Nat'l Castings, Inc. (Amstod Indus. 1),16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737, 1743
(N.D. Ill. 1990).
145 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (1999).
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witness." 146 However, since each state has its own rules of professional conduct,
using opinion counsel as trial counsel may lead to disqualification, depending on the
state in which the problem arises.
Using opinion counsel as trial counsel increases the danger of discovery of work
product. 147 As discussed below in detail, relying on an opinion of counsel defense
waives the attorney-client privilege (and sometimes work-product immunity) as to
information relating to the subject matter of the opinion. For these reasons, opinion
counsel should not be trial counsel and also should not be from the same law firm as
trial counsel.

D. Con tent of the Opinion

1. Opinion Cannot Be Conelusory and Unsupported
"[Tihe opinion letter should be reviewed for its 'overall tone, its discussion of
case law, its analysis of the particular facts and its reference to inequitable
conduct."' 148 Courts look to whether the accused infringer was reasonable in relying
on the opinion of counsel. An opinion containing only "bald, conclusory, and
unsupported remarks" in its analysis cannot be reasonably relied upon and does not
protect against a finding of willfulness. 149 Instead, to remove any doubt that the
opinion is competent, the Federal Circuit has commented that the opinion should
contain "within its four corners a patent validity analysis, properly and explicitly
predicated on a review of the file histories of the patents at issue, and an
infringement analysis that, inter alia, compare[s] and contrast[s] the potentially
infringing method or apparatus with the patented inventions" in order to have
"sufficient internal indicia of creditability." 150 When an opinion does not support its
analysis with a discussion of the facts and is merely conclusory or superficial, courts
have found willful infringement. 151 An opinion of counsel without "analysis of
specific claims, no interpretation of claim language, no discussion of the means-plusfunction claim limitations and no meaningful discussion of the prosecution history"
1 52
was "superficial and conclusory in nature."

Id.
See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1188-90 (E.D. Cal. 2001).
148 Steelcase, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (quoting
Westvaco Corp. v. Int'l Paper Co., 991 F.2d 735, 743-44 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
149 Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
150 Id.
147

151 Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 829 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Critikon, Inc. v. Becton
Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1259-60 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Hayes

Microcomputer Prods., Inc. Patent Litig., 982 F.2d 1527, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (incompetent opinion

"makes broad and conclusory statements with little, if any, support"); SRI Int'l v. Advanced Tech.
Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1466 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (inadequate opinion was "conclusory and woefully
incomplete").
152

Critikon, 120 F.3d at 1259-60.
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2. Opinion Should Lay Out Scope ofInvestigation Conducted
The opinion should also explicitly outline the scope of the investigation
conducted and identify the information on which the opinion is based. Opinions of
counsel that state that the file history, including the prior art of record, have been
reviewed are likely to be found reasonable because they "evidence an adequate
foundation."1 53 In fact, ordering file histories is a "normal and necessary" step before
opining on validity or non-infringement. 154 However, a short opinion that does not
lay out the analysis in detail is not per se conclusory. 155 If opinion counsel has
extensive experience with the accused infringer, its product, and the relevant prior
art and case law, a short opinion that fails to set forth the claim comparisons does
not mean that the opinion lacks adequate foundation. 156 Because the information on
which the opinion is based will usually be important in determining the competence
of the opinion, explicitly identifying these information sources in the opinion is
beneficial. 157 The accused infringer has no assurance that opinion counsel was
sufficiently informed to render a competent opinion if counsel does not set forth the
foundation for the opinion. "An attorney may not have looked into the necessary
facts, and, thus, there would be no foundation for his opinion."158 There may not be
reasonable reliance if the accused infringer merely receives an assurance letter from
a business partner without an accompanying opinion of counsel and does not further
159
investigate.

3. Opinion Must Be Based on Accurate and Complete Information
Courts also examine the accuracy and completeness of information provided to
opinion counsel. The accused infringer who "withholds material information from
counsel in seeking an opinion as to potential infringement cannot subsequently claim
160
good faith reliance upon that opinion in defense to a claim of willful infringement."
Instead, the accused infringer 'must supply all pertinent facts to counsel as a basis
for a reliable opinion."' 161 In Amsted IndustriesI the court found that the accused
infringer should have disclosed to opinion counsel a copy of an opinion it had
previously obtained from a different opinion counsel. 162 The court found that the
15:3Westvaco

Corp. v. Int'l Paper Co., 991 F.2d 735, 744 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
UnderwaterDevices, 717 F.2d at 1390.
155 Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 588, 607
(D. Md. 2002).
150 Id. at 605-07.
157 See, e.g., Read Corp. v. Portee, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 829 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
158 Id.
159 Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
160 Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Nat'l Castings, Inc. (Amstedlndus. 1, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737, 1742 (N.D.
Ill. 1990).
161 Id. at 1741 (quoting Scott Paper Co. v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 1051, 1084
(D. Del. 1984)); see also Southern Clay Prods., Inc. v. United Catalysts, Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1297,
1312 (S.D. Tex. 2001), rev'don other grounds, 43 Fed. Appx. 379 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Clay Productsmay
have been influenced by the district court's opinion of the accused infringer, as expressed in strong
words such as "dishonesty" and "deception.").
1 2 Amstedlndus. j 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1741.
154
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accused infringer could not claim reliance on the opinion of counsel, since it did not
16 3
do SO.
Similarly, the accused infringer must disclose correct information to opinion
counsel. 164 Inaccurate information contained in the opinion should be obvious to the
accused infringer, and the accused infringer would not be reasonable in relying on
such an opinion. 165 Also, the information given to counsel may determine whether
166
the opinion is objective.

E. Updates to the Opinion
Although no continuing duty to reexamine the issue remains after the accused

infringer has made one competent, good-faith determination that it is not infringing
another's valid patent, the accused infringer may have to reexamine its activities
when it later learns new information or receives differing legal advice. 167 The
competency and reliability of an opinion of counsel depends on whether the opinion
has been updated after it was originally obtained to reflect known changes in the
accused infringer's technology. "[Slignificant design changes, in most instances,
would require a new opinion of counsel." 168 As such, an addition of a new component
to the patented device may require an updated opinion of counsel.169

1. Continuous Consultation With PatentAttorney Is Probative of Good Faith
In Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,170 the court found no willful
infringement in light of the accused infringer's frequent contact with counsel, stating
that "on-going consultation with a patent lawyer is highly probative evidence of good
faith." 171 In addition to obtaining several letters from counsel regarding noninfringement of the plaintiffs patents, the court also observed that the accused
infringer's patent attorney "was fully involved as a consultant during all stages of the
design process." 17 2 Attorney participation in designing around another's patent and
16:3Id.
164

Tanashin Denki Co., Ltd. v. Thomson Multimedia, Inc., No. IP-99-836-C-Y/K, 2002 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 14598, at *17 (S.D. Ind. May 24, 2002) (citing Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816,
829 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating erroneous facts will render an opinion incompetent)).
105 Id. at "19.
166 See Minn. Mining & Mfg. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1580-81
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding that the opinion was not objective since the information that formed the
basis of the opinion had been provided to opinion counsel by a person who had a stake in the
outcome instead of an independent expert).
167 McCormick-Morgan, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc. (McCormick 1), 134 F.R.D. 275, 283-84,
rev'don othergrounds,765 F. Supp. 611, 614 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
168 See Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
10) Comark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1191-92 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating
that opinion of counsel should have been updated in light of the fact that a spectrum analyzer was
added to the invention several months after the opinion was rendered).
170 975 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
171
172

Id. at 822.
Id. at 823.
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providing new opinions reflecting changes in technology is evidence of good faith and
will aid in defending a charge of willful infringement.

2. Updates Should Be ConsideredAfter Pertinent Changesin the Law
An opinion of counsel that has been updated to reflect any significant and
relevant changes in the law will likely be viewed favorably. Despite the lack of
authority on this point, attorneys who write patent opinions are advised to review
their opinions when changes in the law occur that are germane to the analysis in the
opinions. For example, if the opinion included a claim construction applying the law
as handed down by the Federal Circuit in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinsoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 173 it would be wise to reevaluate the opinion in light of the Supreme
175
Court's reversal of that decision 174 and the Federal Circuit's ruling on remand.

3. Updates Should Be ObtainedAfter MaterialChanges of Fact
Other circumstances may require an updated opinion. For example, the scope of
the patentee's exclusive right to practice the invention may change through reissue of
the subject patent, thereby rendering the previously obtained opinion inapplicable or
incomplete. In Westvaeo Corp. v. InternationalPaper Co.,176 the accused infringer
was found not liable for willful infringement for several reasons, including reliance
177
upon an updated opinion reflecting the changes in the patentee's reissue patent.
Consequently, a more competent, reliable opinion will reflect any applicable changes
in the law or the rights of the patentee.
Although all of the above factors aid in determining whether an opinion of
counsel is competent, they are only factors and not requirements. The courts have
"never suggested that unless the opinion of counsel met all of those requirements, the
district court is required to find that the infringement is willful." 178 As previously
discussed, even though an opinion obtained by the accused infringer was oral and did
not involve a review of the prior art or the file history, the court found that the
accused infringer did not willfully infringe. 179 Rather, the court held that the accused
infringer acted in good faith because the opinion was obtained from outside patent
counsel and the accused infringer made design modifications as suggested by the
18 0
attorney to avoid infringement of the patent.

173 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en bane).
174
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, 535 U.S. 722, 741-42 (2002).
175 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, 344 F.3d 1359, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
176 991 F.2d 735 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
177 Id.at 744.
178 Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 788 F.2d 1554, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
179

180

Id.
Id.
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IV. WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE

Although relying on advice of counsel is helpful in defending against willful
infringement allegations, "the general rule is that the party waives the attorneyclient privilege regarding all otherwise privileged communications on the subject
matter of the advice." 181 The rationale behind this rule is fairness. 182 "[1it would be
unfair for a party to insist on the protection of the attorney-client privilege for
damaging communications while disclosing other selected communications because
they are self-serving." 183 The accused infringer should not be allowed "to rely on selfserving documents in its defense while withholding potentially damaging information
under the guise of the attorney-client privilege." 184 The test of fairness is whether "it
would be unfair to deny another party an opportunity to discover other relevant
facts" regarding the subject matter at issue.1 85 To protect against producing
privileged documents and information relating to an opinion of counsel, the accused
infringer may choose to exercise its privilege and refuse to produce its opinions of
counsel.1 86 In such cases, the accused infringer may not then introduce the privileged
1 87
documents, including the opinion of counsel, at trial.
Knorr-Bremse did not alleviate the problems and uncertainty faced by the
accused infringer who has decided to produce its opinion of counsel and waive the
privilege. However, the Federal Circuit recently took a step towards clarifying scope
of waiver issues in Echostar.88 The Federal Circuit until recently had avoided the
issue, citing the "fact specific nature" of the scope of waiver inquiry.1 89 Echostar
provides needed guidance, at least with respect to the important questions
surrounding uncommunicated work product waiver.
When the accused infringer relies on the advice-of-counsel defense, some level of
waiver occurs as to documents and information communicated between opinion
counsel and the accused infringer for purposes of obtaining the opinion. 190 In
Echostar, the Federal Circuit summarized the law of attorney-client privilege and
work product immunity, noting that both could be waived, but to different extents-a
waiver of attorney-client privilege waives all communications between attorney and
client on the same subject matter, while a waiver of work product immunity extends
only to "non-opinion" or "factual" work product on the same subject matter, and not
181 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 659, 661 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
182 Mushroom Assocs. v. Monterey Mushrooms Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1767, 1770 (N.D. Cal. 1992);

see also Saint-Gobain/Norton Indus. Ceramics Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 884 F. Supp. 31, 33 (D. Mass.
1995).
183 McCormick-Morgan, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc. (McCormick I1, 765 F. Supp. 611, 613
(N.D. Ca. 1991).
184 Mushroom Assocs., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1770; Saint-Gobain,884 F. Supp. at 33.
185 See Applied Telematics, Inc. v. Sprint Corp., No. 94-CV-4603, 1995 WL 567436, at *1, *3
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 1995).
186 Belmont Textile Mach. Co. v. Superba, S.A., 48 F. Supp. 2d 521, 523 (W.D.N.C. 1999).
187 Id,
188 In re Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
189 See Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing In re
Keeper of the Records XYZ Corp., 348 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2003).

190 See Micron Separations, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 159 F.R.D. 361, 363 (D. Mass. 1995).
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to "opinion" or "mental impression" work product. 191 Noting that there is often a fine
line between "factual" work product and "opinion" work product, the Federal Circuit
directed district courts to use discretion to prevent sword and shield litigation while
protecting work product. 192 What was unclear before Echostar, and to a certain
extent remains unclear, is the subject matter and temporal scope of that waiver and
the extent of the waiver relating to opinions not relied upon or received from counsel
other than opinion counsel. 193 Echostar answered important questions regarding
waiver of uncommunicated work product, as explained below.

A. Choice ofLaw
In Echostar,the Federal Circuit determined that its law applied to the scope of
waiver question, rather than regional circuit law, reasoning that since a remedy for
willful infringement arises from the Patent Act, discoverability and privilege issues
194
related to the defense of willful infringement implicated substantive patent law.
Because of the lack of binding precedent prior to Echsotar, trial courts had not
agreed on the proper scope of waiver of attorney-client privilege and work-product
immunity when the advice-of-counsel defense is used. The following discussion
shows the wide range of decisions that resulted. Since the Echostardecision left the
door open for continuing conflict in some areas of the scope of waiver, many preEchostarcases will continue to provide useful guidance on certain issues.

B. Scope of Waiver ofPrivilege

1. In re Echostar
In Echostar,the accused infringer sought an opinion of non-infringement from
its in-house counsel and then, after filing of suit, from outside counsel. The accused
infringer chose to rely only on the opinion of in-house counsel at trial. 195 The district
court ruled that all communications and work product relating to infringement,
including that of outside counsel, was waived. 196 The waiver extended to work
product of outside counsel not communicated to the client. 197 The district court
reasoned that such documents might be relevant or lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence since they could contain information that was conveyed to the
accused infringer. 198 The district court allowed redaction of information relating only

191 Echostar,448 F.3d at 1300-01.
192

Id. at 1302.

See Mosel Vitelic Corp. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 307, 312 (D. Del. 2000)
(commenting on the past split on this issue).
194 Echostar, 448 F.3d at 1298.
195 Id. at 1297.
196 id. This ruling was affirmed by the Federal Circuit. Id. at 1299.
197 id. at 1297. This ruling was partially affirmed by the Federal Circuit. Id. at 1303-04.
198 Id. at 1297.
19:
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to trial preparation. 199 The waiver included communications made both before and
after the filing of the lawsuit.200
The Federal Circuit granted the accused infringer's and the outside counsel's
petitions for mandamus. The Eehostar decision recognized three categories of
documents potentially relevant to the advice of counsel defense: (1)documents
embodying a communication between the attorney and client concerning the subject
matter of the case; (2) documents analyzing the law, facts, trial strategy, and other
items that reflect the attorneys' mental impressions but not communicated to the
client; and (3) documents that discuss a communication between the attorney and
client concerning the subject matter of the case but that are not provided to the
client. 20 1 As to category one, the Federal Circuit ruled that when a party relies on
the advice of counsel defense to willful infringement, the party waives its attorneyclient privilege for all communications between the attorney and client, including any
documentary communication such as opinion letters and memoranda. 20 2 The Federal
Circuit held that by asserting the advice of counsel defense to charge of willful
infringement, the accused infringer does not waive the privilege as to work product
described in category two. 20 3 The court explained that the "work product waiver
extends only so far as to inform the court of the infringe~rs state of mind." 20 4 What
the accused infringer knew or believed is the proper focus of the willfulness analysis,
and not what other items counsel may have prepared but never communicated to the
client. 20 5 Finally, with respect to the third category of documents, the Federal Circuit
recognized that there may be documents in the attorney's file that reference a
communication between the attorney and client that were not provided to the
client. 20 6 The Federal Circuit held that such work product was discoverable because
it will aid the parties in determining what communications were made to the client
and protect against intentional or unintentional withholding of attorney-client
20 7
communications from the court.
It is likely that the case law harmonized by the Echostardecision will continue
to be relevant to determinations of whether the work product immunity of certain
specific categories of documents is waived when the advice of counsel defense is
asserted. The Federal Circuit itself recognized that there would be documents that
did not fall neatly into one of the three categories. 208 As an example, the decision
does not appear to address squarely the discoverability of a purely factual summary
prepared by counsel relative to the opinion when the summary is not communicated
to the client. It is therefore possible that such documents would be analyzed under
the rubric of "substantial need" laid in out Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3).

199 Id.

200 Id.

Id.
Id.
203 Id. at 1303.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 1304.
201

202

The court gave as an example a lawyer's e-mail to another colleague

summarizing a telephone call with a client discussing potential infringement.
communications would be discoverable. -d.
207 Id,
208 Id.at 1303 n.3.

Id.

Such
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The Eehostar opinion addresses the temporal scope of the waiver in a footnote,
holding that the waiver extends so long as infringement continues, including after
the filing of the lawsuit. 20 9 The decision did not address the issue of waiver of trial
counsel's work product, although the district court allowed redaction of work product
related solely to trial preparation and the Federal Circuit did not comment on this
ruling. 2 10 It now seems more likely that the waiver will extend to any opinion the
accused infringer receives, and not only to the opinion relied upon.
Prior to Eehostar, the courts generally agreed that relying on the advice-ofcounsel defense waived the attorney-client privilege as to information communicated
between opinion counsel and the accused infringer to some extent regardless of
whether the courts allowed waiver of work-product immunity. 211 The reason was
that "a party needs access to privileged information underlying the advisory letter
because it cannot analyze reliance upon the advice of counsel without reference to the
circumstances surrounding the issuance of the advice or the formation of the opinions
contained in the advice."

212

2. Waiver ofPrivilege Regardinga Written Opinion of Counsel
The case law is likely unsettled as to whether a written opinion of counsel must
be produced in its entirety when the accused infringer relies on only one portion of
the opinion. The Federal Circuit summarized its Eehcotar ruling by stating that
"Wherefore, when an alleged infringer asserts its advice-of-counsel defense regarding
willful infringement of a particular patent, it waives its immunity for any document
or opinion that embodies or discusses a communication to or from it concerning
2 13
whether that patent is valid, enforceable, andinfringed by the accused."
In the past, some cases held that if the accused infringer obtained an opinion of
counsel addressing more than one issue, the scope of waiver depended on the issues
the accused infringer is relying on for its advice-of-counsel defense.2 14 In SaintGobain/Norton Industrial Ceramies Corp. v. General Electric Co., 2 15 the accused
infringer elected to present only good-faith reliance on the opinion of counsel that the
patent was invalid as a defense to willful infringement, and thus, the court allowed
the opinion to be redacted for the issues other than validity. 216 Similarly, where the

accused infringer obtained an opinion of counsel addressing other patents in Solomon
v. limberly-Clark Corp.,217 the court allowed redaction of the portions of the opinion
218
that did not address the patent-in-suit.
209
210

Id. at 1303 n.4.
Id. at 1297.

211 Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Eon Labs Mfg. Inc., 206 F.R.D. 396, 397 (D. Del. 2002) (finding
that the courts are consistent to the extent that the attorney-client privilege is waived).
212 Mushroom Assocs. v. Monterey Mushrooms Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1767, 1770 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
213 Eehostar,448 F.3d at 1304 (emphasis added).
214 Saint-Gobain/Norton Indus. Ceramics Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 884 F. Supp. 31, 34 (D. Mass.
1995); Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 98-C-7598, 1999 WL 89570, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12,
1999).
215 884 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1995).

216

Id. at 34.

217

1999 WL 89570 (N.D. 11. Feb. 12, 1999).

218

Id. at *2.
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On the other hand, several pre-Eehostarcourts held that the accused infringer
must produce the written opinion in its entirety even if those portions relate to other
220
patents or other subject matters. 219 The court in Steelease Inc. v. Haworth, Inc.
required the accused infringer to produce the entire opinion, without redaction, even
if irrelevant information was produced. 221 "Because of the centrality of the opinion
letter itself under Federal Circuit analysis, the opinion must be produced in its
entirety, without redaction." 222 Another court found that allowing the patentee
access to the entire opinion gave the patentee an opportunity to more thoroughly
examine the opinion. 223 Further, the only way the plaintiff could test its premise that
the accused infringer believed that its actions would infringe some patents was for
the accused infringer to know what other patents were considered in those
opinions. 224 Therefore, it likely remains difficult to predict whether a court would
require production of the entire written opinion or allow redaction when the opinion
contains subject matter not related to the advice-of-counsel defense. If read literally,
Echostar no longer allows for parsing the scope based on the particular subject
matter of the opinion relied upon.
Several courts have interpreted Echostarto have held that the waiver extended
to any communication regarding the validity, infringement, and enforceability of the
patent at issue, apparently relying in part on the Federal Circuit's use of the phrase
"concerning the subject matter of the easd' and not "subject matter of the opinion"
when describing the documents embodying a communication. 225 The court also cited
226
the Federal Circuit's "valid, enforceable, and infringed" language discussed above.

219 Steelcase Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (W.D. Mich. 1997); Viskase Corp. v.
Am. Nat'l Can Co., 888 F. Supp. 899, 900 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
220 954 F.Supp. 1195 (W.D.
Mich. 1997).
2'1Id. at 1198.
222Id.
223 Viskase Corp., 888 F. Supp. at 900.
221 Id. (finding in an in camera review that redacted patents are not protected by the attorneyclient privilege and must be disclosed because at least one of the patents was used as the basis for a
non-infringement opinion).
225 See, e.g., Intex Recreation Corp. v. Team Worldwide Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 46, 50 (D.D.C.
July 14, 2006) (emphasis added) (citing In re Echostar Commc'ns. Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed.
Cir. 2006)).
226 Id.(emphasis added); see also Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Tyco Healthcare Retail Group, No.
05C985, 2007 WL 218721, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 26, 2007) (holding similarly that all

communications regarding the validity, enforceability, and infringement of the patent at issue were
waived); Affinion Net Patents, Inc. v. Maritz, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 354, 355 (D. Del. July 28, 2006)
(holding the same). But see CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Mitchell Int'l, Inc., No. 03-C-2695, 2006 WL
3486810, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2006) (allowing redaction of sections of non-infringement opinion
addressing potential damages); Ampex Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. CIV A. 04-1373-KAJ, 2006
WL 1995140, at *3 (D. Del. July 17, 2006) (reading Eehostar as implying that "the type of
communications being discussed are opinions expressed in a manner comparable to the opinion that
is disclosed").
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3. Subject Matter Limitationson the Waiver of Privilege with Respect to Documents
Other Than the Written Opinion
Prior to Echostar,the majority of the courts believed that the scope of waiver as
to information and documents other than the written opinion itself should include
only the subject matter relied upon for the advice-of-counsel defense. For example, if
the accused infringer obtained an opinion of counsel only on infringement issues,
waiver would be limited to the communications regarding infringement. In the same
way, an accused infringer who relies only on an
invalidity opinion can likely limit the
waiver to communications regarding validity.22 ' "[in a case in which there is more
than one issue and reliance [on] the advice of counsel [goes] to only one issue, the
waiver would not extend to the other issue."2 28 Therefore, if the case involves the
issues of infringement and validity of a patent but the only opinion of counsel the
accused infringer uses is the portion that says the patent is invalid as a defense to
willfulness, then the waiver should only apply to privileged documents relating to the
229
validity of the patent.
Other courts have found that separate issues may be so interrelated that waiver
by issue is not practical. One court found ordering production of opinions on validity,
and not on infringement and other subjects, unfair when the opinions included claim
constructions of the same patents. Therefore, the court ruled that other opinions
that construed the same claims as those in the opinion relied upon must be produced
even if they did not address the subject matter of the opinion relied upon.2 30 In
Thermos Co. v. Starbucks Corp. & Pacific Market, Inc.,23 1 the court found that where
opinion counsel also examined validity and prior art and compared the two methods
while addressing infringement in the opinion letter, privilege was waived as to all
those subject matters.2 3 2 The Thermos court examined the language of the opinion
letters and found that the opinions addressed more than just an analysis of
infringement.2 33 In one opinion letter, opinion counsel stated that its conclusion was

227 Greene, Tweed of Del., Inc. v. DuPont Dow Elastomers, L.L.C., 202 F.R.D. 418, 422 (E.D.
Pa. 2001); Nitinol Med. Techs., Inc. v. AGA Med. Corp., 135 F. Supp. 2d 212, 217 (D. Mass. 2000);
see also Akeva L.L.C. v. Mizuno Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 418, 422-23 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (holding that
where an accused infringer has only relied on an opinion of non-infringement, the extent of the
waiver only extends to communications regarding non-infringement); e Verizon Cal., Inc. v. Ronald
A. Katz Tech. Licensing, L.P., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1150 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding defendant's
reliance on portions of counsel's opinion for invalidity waived privilege as to non-infringement
portions of the same opinion, because invalidity is a basis for noninfringement and defendant failed
to meet its burden to show no waiver).
228 Micron Separations, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 159 F.R.D. 361, 365 n.8 (D. Mass. 1995).
229 Id.
But see McCormick-Morgan, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc. (McCormick 1), 134 F.R.D.
275, 281 (N.D. Cal. 1991), rov'd on other grounds, 765 F. Supp. 611 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (finding
privilege waived on all issues with respect to invalidity, infringement, and enforceability, but not
any other affirmative defenses).
230 Soo Motorola, Inc. v. Vosi Techs., Inc., No. 01C4182, 2002 WL 1917256, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 19, 2002).
231 No. 96C3833, 1998 WL 781120 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 1998).
232 Id. at *3.

233Id.
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"based on [counsel's] understanding of the prior art."23 4 Likewise, a second opinion
letter written by another opinion counsel extensively discussed the prior art and
stated that the opinion was based on "the prior art cited and relied upon in the
prosecution history [of the patent]."235 The second opinion counsel had also compared
the plaintiffs patent with the accused infringer's activities. Because the opinions
contained these discussions, the court held that privilege was waived as to the
236
subject matter of validity and prior art and any comparisons of the two methods.
The court did not consider that a thorough analysis of the patent, including the prior
art and file history and the accused infringer's activities, is a factor in determining
whether an opinion of counsel is competent.23 7 However, the general rule was that
the accused infringer "waives the privilege only with respect to the subject of the
advice upon which the party intends to rely ... as a defense." 238 Post-EchoStarthe
general consensus among district courts seems to be that all communications on the
subjects of invalidity, enforceability, and infringement are waived. The Federal
Circuit will likely be asked for additional guidance in this area.

4 Time Limitations on the Waiver of Privilege and Extending Waiver to Trial
Counsel
The Eehostaropinion addresses the temporal scope of the waiver in a footnote,
holding that the waiver extends so long as infringement continues, including after
the filing of the lawsuit. 239 However, in IndianaMills & Manufacturing,Inc. v. Dorel
Industries, Inc.,240 the district court reasoned that Echostar did not hold that the
temporal scope of the waiver always extended post-filing. 241 Rather, the court found
that in the circumstance where there is no evidence that opinions or advice obtained
post-filing contradicted earlier opinions, the need to protect the attorney-client
privilege and work product privilege outweighed the need for discovery. 242 The court
noted that in a situation where post-filing opinions, whether they be of trial counsel,
in-house counsel, or other outside counsel, differed from those obtained pre-filing,
such opinions might be discoverable as they could bear on the reasonableness of the
accused infringer's continued reliance on the pre-filing opinions. 243 Note that the
district court later withdrew its opinion, citing a misunderstanding based on the

234 Id.

235 Id.
236
237

Id.

See Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir.

1983).
238 Applied Telematics, Inc. v. Sprint Corp., CIV.A No. 94-CV-4603, 1995 WL 567436, at *2
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 1995); see also Fonar Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 227 U.S.P.Q. 886, 888
(D. Mass. 1985); Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, L.P. v. AT&T Corp., 191 F.R.D. 433, 440 (E.D. Pa.

2000).

In re Echostar, Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1303, n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
No. 1:04CV01102-LJM-WTL, 2006 WL 1749413 (S.D. Ind. May 26, 2006).
241 Id. at *7.
239

240

242 Id.
243

Id. at *7, n.2.
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court's belief that the accused infringer had not sought any opinions of counsel after
the filing of the lawsuit.244

Other post-Echostardecisions have been somewhat inconsistent, but generally
favor a broad waiver. One court held that to the extent the accused infringer relies
upon an opinion of counsel as a defense to willful infringement, information related
to the opinion is discoverable, despite being generated after the commencement of
litigation. 245 Likewise, if an opinion of counsel is prepared after litigation begins, and
is relevant to ongoing willful infringement, it is also discoverable. 246 In the Affinion
case, there were separate trial counsel and opinion counsel, although from the same
firm. 247

This did not appear to matter to the court, which held that the accused

infringer had waived the attorney-client privilege as to communications with
"litigation counsel," and any other counsel, to the extent the communications relate
to non-infringement, invalidity, and any other defense to infringement. 248 This
waiver included post-filing communications. Another post-Echostarcase found that
"Echostar's limited discussion concerning [the temporal scope of waiver] issue is
inapplicable to the instant dispute" and ordered the accused infringer to produce
witnesses and all documents generated by its counsel subsequent to the oral opinion
relied upon which either question or contradict in any way the competence or validity
of the opinion rendered. 249 Another court rejected the argument that waiver should
extend to trial counsel as it would "demolish[ J the practical significance of the
attorney-client privilege, a result obviously at odds with other comments in
250
Echostar."
Genentech, Inc. v. Insmed, Inc. 251 adopted a particularly refined approach:
The Court adopts a middle approach that seeks to preserve in some fashion
trial strategy while requiring disclosure of communications that are central
&Mfg., 2006 WL 1993420 (order withdrawing earlier opinion).
245 Affinion Net Patents, Inc. v. Maritz, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 354, 357 (D. Del. 2006).
244 Ind.Mills

In

ComputerAssoc. Intl, Inc. v. Simple.com, Inc., the court affirmed the special master's decision that
waiver extended to all opinions of trial counsel on same subject matter as the opinions relied upon
and extended the waiver past time of filing of suit due to ongoing allegation of infringement. No.02
Civ. 2748-DRH-MLO, 2006 WL 3050883, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2006). The court allowed in
camera review of documents alleged to relate to trial strategy. Id. The court also made the
interesting observation that "[1]itigation strategy and advice of counsel are not the same." Id.
216 ComputerAssoc. Int'l,2006 WL 3050883, at *5.
247 Affinion, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 356.
24 8 Id.
249 Intex Recreation Corp. v. Team Worldwide Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d, 46, 52-53 (D.D.C. 2006).

In Intex, the accused infringer used the same attorney as opinion counsel and trial counsel. Id. at
52. The holding of Intex was adopted in Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexma-rk Int, Inc.,
where Lexmark sought document and deposition discovery from lead counsel for one defendant of a
multi-defendant group wherein a different defendant had produced an opinion of counsel,
apparently seeking the joint defense group's discussions regarding the opinion. Static Control
Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., No. 06-cv-02182-JLK-BNB, 2007 WL 219955, at *3 (D. Colo.
Jan. 25, 2007). The court found that trial counsel communications that contradicted the opinion
relied upon were discoverable, but quashed the subpoena because Lexmark had not established that
any information had actually been communicated to the client. Id. at *5-6.
250 Ampex Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 04-1373-KAJ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48702, at *9
(D. Del. July 17, 2006).
251 442 F. Supp. 2d 838 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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and material to Defendants' decision to engage in allegedly infringing
activity. Waiver of trial counsel communication with the client should
apply to documents and communications that are most akin to that which
opinion counsel normally renders-l.e., documents and communications
that contain opinions (formal or informal) and advice central and highly
material to the ultimate questions of infringement and invalidity (the
subject matter of the advice given by Foley opinion counsel). While this
approach would include the most significant opinions and views expressed
by trial counsel to Defendants (upon which a reasonable inference of
reliance may be drawn), it would exclude lower level documents and
communications that are more akin to discussions of trial strategy. For
instance, a communication about the likelihood of success on infringement
in light of the venue and probably jury pool is of central materiality to the
ultimate question of infringement, and should therefore be produced.
However, a discussion about the tactics of jury selection, the theme of the
opening statement to the jury, etc. should not be disclosed. Likewise,
predictions about how the judge will construe key claims and their impact
on the outcome of the case should be produced, but discussions about which
arguments should be made to the judge should not. The dividing line
revolves around the degree of materiality to the client's decision to launch
the accused product (and continue its sale). Only that advice and work
product of trial counsel that is reasonably central to that decision-and
which presumably would carry the same kind of weight that advice from
opinion counsel normally would-is waived. In this regard, all other things
being equal, any negative opinions or views of trial counsel should be
presumed to have a higher degree of materiality since one would expect the
client would pay particularly close attention to such negative advice.
Nonetheless, the degree of materiality to the ultimate question of invalidity
or infringement would still have to be assessed even as to these negative
communications. Thus, for instance, a report on a deposition that states a
favorable deponent was not as helpful as hoped would likely not be
producible, unless the deponent were a key witness testifying on a
potentially dispositive matter such that the testimony would likely have a
252
central and material effect on the outcome of the case.

Another illustrative order issued as follows after the Echostardecision:
[The accused infringer] must review its privilege log, and any documents
generated by trial counsel on the subject matter of the opinion letters that
may not be on the privilege log, in order to determine whether it has
produced the full scope of what is required under Echostar. In making that
determination, [the accused infringer] may not assert attorney-client
privilege or work product protection for the following categories of
documents that relate to the same subject matter as the legal advice on
which they rely: (1) communications between [the accused infringer] and
252

Id. at 847.
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any counsel (including trial counsel), including communications which
conveyed to the [the accused infringer] work-product information; and (2)
documents from the files of [the accused infringer's] attorneys (including
trial counsel) that were not conveyed to [the accused infringer], but that
discuss work product information that was communicated to [the accused
infringer]. With respect to this latter category, [the accused infringer] may
not withhold documents on the ground that the work-product information
fails to contradict or cast doubt on the legal advice on which [the accused
infringer] relies; however, [the accused infringer] may redact any references
to work-product material that was not communicated to [the accused
infringer]. As recognized both in EchoStarand Beneficial,the time scope of
this waiver is not limited to the period ending with the commencement of
suit, but continues to include the affected attorney-client and work-product
253
materials generated after suit commenced.
Another court's order interpreting Echostarissued as follows:
This Court finds that, by asserting advice of counsel as a defense to a
charge of willful infringement of [patentee's] patents, [the accused infringer]
waived privilege for both pre-and post-filing pertinent attorney-client
communications and work product. Under the analysis in Echostar,it is
immaterial whether [the accused infringer's] opinion counsel and trial
counsel are from the same firm, different firms or are even the same person.
What matters is that:
1. [The accused infringer] relies on advice of counsel as a defense to
[patentee's] charge that it willfully infringed [patentee's] patents;
2. Therefore, [the accused infringer] waives privilege for communications
with counsel on the subject of the opinion or advice on which it relies as well
as work product on that subject communicated to [the accused infringer] or
which refers to communications on that subject;
3. [The patentee] alleges that [the accused infringer] continues to infringe
[patentee's] patents;
4. Therefore [the patentee] is entitled to information subject to waiver
which [the accused infringer] received even after [the patentee] filed its
complaint;
5. The categories of information which [the accused infringer] must turn
over to [the patentee] include (a) attorney-client communications with any
counsel on the subject of the opinion or advice on which [the accused
infringer] relies; (b) work product communicated to [the accused infringer]
253 Beck Sys., Inc. v. Managesoft Corp., No. 05"C-2036, 2006 WL 2037356, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July
14, 2006).
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on that same subject; (c) work product which reflects any communication on
that subject.
Attorney legal opinions, impressions and trial strategy
unrelated to the opinion on which [the accused infringer] relies may be
redacted from documents to be produced to [the patentee].254
The Federal Circuit sua sponte took up a mandamus petition filed by defendant
Seagate Technology, L.L.C. in connection with Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer
Corp., 224 F.R.D. 98, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).255 The parties were ordered to address the
following issues:
(1) Should a party's assertion of the advice of counsel defense to willful
infringement extend waiver of the attorney-client privilege
to
communications with that party's trial counsel?
See In re EehoStar
Communication Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006). (2) What is the effect
of any such waiver on work-product immunity? (3) Given the impact of the
statutory duty of care standard announced in UnderwaterDevices, Inc. v.
Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983), on the issue of
waiver of attorney-client privilege, should this court reconsider the decision
256
in Underwater Devices and the duty of care standard itself'?
A substantial volume of amicus briefing is anticipated in the Seagate case. For
example, on February 12, 2007, the American Bar Association House of Delegates
passed the following resolutions in anticipation of filing an ABA amicus brief:
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association supports the principle that
a party's assertion of the advice-of-counsel defense to a charge of willful
patent infringement does not waive the attorney-client privilege with
respect to communications with that party's trial counsel, so long as such
trial counsel is not the same counsel who provided the opinion upon which
the accused infringer relies;
FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association supports the
principle that a party's assertion of the advice-of-counsel defense to a charge
of willful patent infringement does not waive the work product privilege of
that party's trial counsel, so long as such trial counsel is not the same
counsel who provided the opinion upon which the accused infringer relies;
FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association supports the
principle that a legally consistent standard for a patent infringer to be
liable for enhanced, or punitive, damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 is
"reprehensible conduct" in accord with general Supreme Court standards
for punitive damages; and

254 Informatica Corp. v. Business Objects Data Integration, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 957, 965 (N.D.
Cal. July 14, 2006). The magistrate's order was confirmed by the district court in Informatica Corp.
v. Business Objects Data IntegTation, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58976 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2006).
255 In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., Misc. No. 830, 2007 WL 196403 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 2007); see
inf a note
291 and accompanying text.
250

In re Seagate, 2007 WL 196403, at *1.
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FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association supports
replacement of the affirmative duty of due care standard set forth in
Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed.
257
Cir. 1983), with the foregoing reprehensible conduct standard.
Prior to Echostar,some courts had considered a temporal limit on the scope of
the waiver. These courts limited the waiver of opinion counsel's communications
and/or work product relating to the opinion of counsel to the time period prior to the
filing of the lawsuit. 258 This temporal limitation was motivated by a desire to protect
trial strategy and planning and also to protect communications between trial counsel
and the accused infringer. 259 It was also noted that the reliance on an opinion-ofcounsel defense for willfulness would "logically" depend upon opinions obtained
before the lawsuit was filed. 260
Without such limitation, the waiver would
"inappropriately chill communications between trial counsel and client and would
impair trial counsel's ability to give the client candid advice regarding the merits of
the case." 261 A few courts did not give a reason for the temporal limitations on the
262
waiver of privilege.
Other courts justified temporal limitations because willful infringement depends
on the accused infringer's state of mind at the time of the infringement-documents
and information outside this time frame are not relevant. Thus, documents created
after litigation began are not relevant, and waiver of privilege should not apply to
such documents. 263 In so holding, one court found that the infringement at issue was
a one-time act, so later developments that may have modified opinion counsel's
original assessment were not discoverable. 264 However, most cases do not involve a
single act of infringement, and thus courts circumvented this reasoning. These
courts allowed the waiver of privilege to continue beyond the time of plaintiffs filing
of suit when infringement is alleged to have continued beyond that point. There was
"no automatic cut-off of discovery" at the beginning of the suit if the plaintiff alleges
continuing infringement. 265 Likewise, when an accused infringer relying on an

Op. A.B.A.

Section of Intellectual Prop. Law 302 (2007).
See, e.g., Douglas Press, Inc. v. Universal Mfg. Co., No.01-C-2565, 2003 WL 21361731, at
*3 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2003); Dunhall Pharms., Inc. v. Discus Dental, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1202, 1206
257
258

(C.D. Cal. 1998); Electro Sci. Indus., Inc. v. General Scanning, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 539, 546 (N.D. Cal.
1997); Motorola, Inc. v. Vosi Techs., Inc., No. 01C4182, 2002 WL 1917256, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19,
2002).
25) Dunhall, 994 F. Supp. at 1206; Electro Sci., 175 F.R.D. at 546 ('[D]ocuments with more
direct tactical sensitivity, like outlines of possible questions for deponents or trial witnesses, or
compilations of materials to be used to support an argument to the jury, would remain off limits.").
260 Douglas Press, 2003 WL 21361731, at *3 (citing Motorola, 2002 WL 1917256, at *2).
201 Id. at *2 (quoting Motorola, 2002 WL 1917256, at *2).
262 Micron Separations, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 159 F.R.D. 361, 364-65 (D. Mass. 1995); Carl Zeiss
Jena GmbH v. Bio-Rad Labs. Inc., No. 98 Civ. 8012-RCC-DFE, 2000 WL 1006371, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
July 19, 2000) (citing Dunha], 994 F. Supp. at 1206); Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Motor Wheel Corp., 155
F.R.D. 170, 172 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
263 Hoover Universal, Inc. v. Graham Packaging Corp., 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1596, 1598 (C.D. Cal.
1996).
264 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 659, 661-63 (S.D. Ind.

2001).
2 5 Applied Telematics, Inc. v. Sprint Corp., No. 94-CV-4603, 1995 WL 567436, at *5 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 21, 1995); Akeva LLC v. Mizuno Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 418, 423 (M.D.N.C. 2003); Verizon
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advice-of-counsel defense makes substantial changes to its activities after filing suit,
the court could order the accused infringer to disclose the legal advice it received that
led to the changes. 266 For other courts, the reason for allowing discovery of
documents and information created after the filing of suit is simply that "the better
authority requires that all communications, both pre and post-complaint filing,
should be disclosed. 267

C. Pre-Echostar Casesin Waiver of Uncommunicated Work-Product
Prior to Echostar,courts differed on the extent to which reliance on the adviceof-counsel defense waived protection of work product known to opinion counsel, but
not communicated to the accused infringer. 268 Courts generally made a distinction
between waiver of attorney-client privilege and waiver of work-product immunity as
it relates to opinion counsel's thoughts and impressions of the case. 269 However, the
courts were split as to the scope of the waiver of work-product protection. The point
of departure was principally whether uncommunicated work product was directly at
issue when determining willfulness. In one line of cases, the courts believed that all
of the documents and information containing work product of opinion counsel,
whether or not communicated to the accused infringer, affected the drafting of the
opinion and also the accused infringer's state of mind while carrying on allegedly
infringing activities. Therefore, discovery of anything related or referring to the
opinion, including work product, was allowed. In the other line of cases, the courts
believed that only documents and information actually communicated to the accused
infringer affected the accused infringer's state of mind, and thus, limited the scope of
discovery to documents and information actually communicated to or known by the
accused infringer.

1. BroadScope of Waiver:No CommunicationNeeded
The case often cited as the leading case for a broad scope of waiver as to all work
product, regardless of communication to the accused infringer, was Mushroom
Associates v. Monterey Mushroom, Inc. 270 from the Northern District of California.
The court held that "[a]ll documents containing work product relevant to the
infringement issue must be produced." 271 The reason was that "[t]he work product is

Cal., Inc. v. Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1148-49 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (citing
Akeva, 243 F. Supp. 2d, at 423).
266 Bristol Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1909-10 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1188 (E.D. Cal. 2001).
Separations, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 159 F.R.D. 361, 363 n.4 (D. Mass. 1995).
269 Greene Tweed of Del., Inc. v. DuPont Dow Elastomers, L.L.C., 202 F.R.D. 418, 423 (E.D. Pa.
2001) (pointing out an important distinction between waiver of attorney-client privilege and work
product immunity). The party asserting attorney-client privilege has the burden of proving that
privilege applies, the party seeking to discover work product has the burden of proving waiver. Id.
267

268 Micron

270
271

24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1767 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
Id. at 1771.
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directly at issue." 272

The patentee had a compelling need for all work product

documents and information related to the opinion of counsel in order to fully respond
to the advice-of-counsel defense. 273 The court found it important for the patentee to
understand what information was known by opinion counsel at the time the opinion
was given so as to evaluate whether the accused infringer's reliance on the opinion
was reasonable. 274 The court also granted access to test results used by opinion
counsel even though the patentee could have run its own tests concerning the patent,
since the relevant test results were those known to opinion counsel at the time the
opinion was given. 275 Another court noted that access to documents and information

containing uncommunicated work product yielded the "fullest, most accurate record
276
possible."
Courts following Musbhroom found that work product not communicated to the
accused infringer might nonetheless be "highly probative" of the accused infringer's
state of mind.2 7 7 The court in Electro Scientific Industries,Inc. v. GeneralScanning,
Inc. 278 explained:

Documents in the files of [opinion] counsel might be highly probative [on the
issues] of whether [the client] in fact received additional communications
from counsel about the issues addressed in the opinion letter, and ...
whether any such additional communications included views, information,
or analysis that w[ere] in any material way different from the views,
information or analysis in that letter.
... It is possible that documents in opinion counsel's work product file could
reflect very different analyses and conclusions than [those that were] set
forth in the one disclosed letter. The fact that the analyses and conclusions
in the lawyer's private file were clearly at odds with the content of the
disclosed opinion would tend to support an inference that there were
additional communications between client and [opinion] counsel and that in
those communications the client received opinions that were not consistent
with the views expressed in the letter.

27,2Id.
273 Id.; Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1189 (E.D. Cal. 2001); Saint
Gobain/Norton Indus. Ceramics Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 884 F. Supp. 31, 34 (D. Mass. 1995); Mosel
Vitelic Corp. v. Michron Tech., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 307, 312 (D. Del. 2000).
274 Matsushita Elecs. Corp. v. Loral Corp., No. 92-Civ-5461, 1995 WL 527640, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 7, 1995).
275 Mushroom Assocs., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1771.
276 Chiron, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1189.
277 Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., 206 F.R.D. 396, 398 (D. Del. 2002); Mosel
Vitelie, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 312; Mushroom Assocs., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1771; Dunhall Pharms. v.
Discus Dental, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1202, 1205 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Verizon Cal., Inc. v. Ronald A. Katz
Tech. Licensing, L.P., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
278 175 F.R.D. 539 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
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[1it would be ... irrational to assume that there could be no relationship
between what [opinion] counsel really thought (as reflected in [their]
private papers) and what [opinion counsel] in fact communicated to [the]
client. In this important sense, evidence about what really was in the
lawyer's mind could be quite relevant to what really was in the client's
...

mind.

27 9

2. Narrow Scope of Waiver: Comm umcation Needed
The above reasons did not persuade the courts that followed Thorn EMI North
America, Inc. v. Micron Technology Inc. 280 These decisions have continuing viability
as Echostarbasically adopted their reasoning. Therefore, the individual facts and
precise scopes of waivers ordered remain applicable to future cases. The courts
finding a narrow scope of waiver allowed discovery into privileged documents used by
opinion counsel in rendering an opinion only when such documents had been
communicated to the accused infringer. 281 This line of cases also found that when the
accused infringer used the advice-of-counsel defense, waiver of privileged and
protected documents occurs because of fairness considerations. 2 2 However, these
courts believed that "[tihe facts of consequence to the determination of a claim of
willful infringement relate to the infringer's state of mind.
Counsel's mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories are not probative of that state of
28 3
mind unless they have been communicated to that client."
In Chimie v. PPG Industries, Inc., 28 4 the court followed Thorn and explained
that allowing discovery of work product not communicated to the client would only
encourage an unscrupulous lawyer to keep dishonest files, while the truth is driven
deeper into the shadows. 28 5 In Simmons, Inc. v. Bombardier,Inc., 28 6 the court denied
a motion to compel protection of draft opinion letters not sent to the client even
though opinion counsel's produced time sheets suggested numerous conversations
28 7
between counsel and accused infringer before the final opinion letters were sent.
279 Id. at 545.

837 F. Supp. 616 (D. Del. 1993).
Id. at 622.
282 See Thermos Co. v. Starbucks Corp. & Pac. Mkt., Inc., No. 96C3833, 1998 WL 781120, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3,1998).
283 Thorn, 837 F. Supp. at 622.
284 218 F.R.D. 416 (D. Del. 2003).
285 Id. at 420. The court also ruled that reliance on the advice-of-counsel defense does not
waive the privilege as to information or opinions regarding foreign counterpart patents to the
patent-in-suit. Id. at 418.
28( 221 F.R.D. 4, 10-11 (D.D.C. 2004).
287 Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 98-C-7598, 1999 WL 89570, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12,
1999) (following Thorn); see also Steelcase, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1195, 1199-2000
(W.D. Mich. 1997); Thermos, 1998 WL 781120, at *4; McCormick-Morgan, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus.,
Inc. (McCormick 1), 134 F.R.D. 275, 280, rev'd on other grounds, 765 F. Supp. 611 (N.D. Cal. 1991);
AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 234 F. Supp. 2d 711, 716 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (holding waiver of
privilege in advice-of-counsel defense should not waive attorney work-product protection); Patent
Holding Co. v. TG (USA) Corp., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1566, 1569 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
280

281
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These courts reasoned that the advice-of-counsel
infringer's state of mind at issue. 28 8

defense placed the accused

Thorn and its progeny focus on what the accused

infringer knew about counsel's independence and competence, the basis of counsel's
opinion, and the accused infringer's belief as to the reasonableness and reliability of
such opinion. 28 9 Accordingly, protection is not waived as to work product generated
290
by opinion counsel that is not disclosed to the accused infringer.
The courts have a "duty to strike a reasonable balance between preserving the
attorney-client privilege (or work product protection) and allowing a necessary
exploration of bias." 291 To explore the state of mind of the accused infringer during

infringement, the scope of waiver should be "broad" to the extent necessary to
investigate the accused infringer's state of mind. 292 In BASF AktiengeseJschaft v.

Reilly Industries, Inc., 293 the court ordered production of all pre- and post-filing
attorney-client communications and work product communicated to the client. 294 The

accused infringer's counsel complained that this order, plus the requirement that a
privilege log be produced for pre- and post-filing documents, would likely put trial
counsel in the position of becoming a fact witness.

295

The court was unsympathetic,

noting the accused infringer brought the problem on itself by using the same firm as
both trial and opinion counsel. 296 The court justified its decision to include post-filing
communications and work product in the waiver not because the patentee alleged
continuing infringement, but because the accused infringer proffered an opinion after
297
the filing of the lawsuit that arguably contradicted an earlier opinion.
The Thorn line of cases allowed discovery of information that the accused
infringer possessed regarding the subject matter of the opinion. 298 Discoverable
information included the privately held views and information of the accused
infringer regarding validity, enforceability, and/or infringement, or private reactions
to the opinions (i.e., information not shared with lawyers).299 However, the courts
found that discovery of protected or privileged documents not disclosed to the accused
infringer would not aid in the exploration of the accused infringer's state of mind,

134 F.R.D. at 280.
Nitinol Med. Techs., Inc. v. AGA Med. Corp., 135 F. Supp. 2d 212, 219 (D. Mass. 2000). The
Nitinol court also theorized that the client in Cordis Corp. v. SciMed Life Systgems, Inc., 980
F. Supp. 1030 (D. Minn. 1997), knew of the factual basis for its counsel's opinion, although the
Cordis opinion does not directly support this assumption. Nitinol, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 218-19. The
Nitinol court also cautioned that the fact that an alleged infringer did not have information about
the factual basis of counsel's opinion may, in and of itself, be relevant to whether the infringer's
reliance on the opinion was proper. Id. at 219 n.il.
290 Steelease, 954 F. Supp. at 1199-1200.
291 Solomon, 1999 WL 89570, at *3.
292 Steelease, 954 F. Supp. at 1199.
293 283 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (D. Ind. 2003).
294 Id. at 1008.
295 Id. at 1007.
296 Id.
297 Id. at 1008.
298 See, e.g., Allergan Inc. v. Pharmacia Corp., No. Civ.A.01-141-SLR, 2002 WL 1268047, at *2
(D. Del. May 17, 2002).
299 McCormick-Morgan, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc. (MeCormick 1), 134 F.R.D. 275, 280 (N.D.
Cal. 1991), rev'don othergrounds, 765 F. Supp. 611 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
288 MConrmiek,
289
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and thus, does not discharge the duty to strike a reasonable balance. 30 0 Therefore,
the courts in this line of cases generally found that the accused infringer waived
attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity only as to documents and
information in the accused infringer's possession, or that the accused infringer had
30 1
received relating to the subject matter of the opinion of counsel on which it relied.
To further compromise between the proper inquiry in willful infringement cases
and the protection of work product, some courts have allowed discovery of work
product communicated to the accused infringer containing conclusions that
contradict or cast doubt on prior opinions obtained by the accused infringer. 30 2 This
waiver usually does not include communications received by the accused infringer
from its current trial counsel if such documents contain the "mental impressions,
conclusions, opinion, or legal opinions, or legal theories" of current trial counsel and
303
are consistent with the opinion letter.
In Beneficial Franchise,the court held that privilege was waived with respect to
all work product of opinion counsel and to any work product of trial counsel that
casts doubt on the opinions, regardless of whether such work product was
communicated to the client. 304 The same court later adopted a hybrid solution in
Lakewood Engineering & ManufacturingCo. v. Lasko Products,Inc.,30 5 blending the
holdings of Thermos and Beneficial Franchise to formulate an order that required
disclosure of trial counsel work product that cast doubt on the opinions, regardless of
whether the work product was communicated to the client, but with the rather large
loophole that if trial counsel's opinion would not be relied upon at trial, there was no
need to disclose such opinions.30 6 The Lasko court found the waiver to include work
product such as the "attorneys' thought processes, notes, mental impressions, or
materials" where the information "contradicts or casts doubt on the opinions that
have been disclosed, and regardless of whether these materials were communicated
to [the accused infringer.] '307 Echostar certainly calls into question the viability of
the Beneficial Franchise and Lasko holdings, but it is not inconceivable that a
district court could develop a distrust of an accused infringer's opinion counsel's good

300 Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 98-C-7598, 1999 WL 89570, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12,

1999).
301 Allergan Inc., 2002 WL 1268047, at *2; Steelcase, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1195,
1199-1200 (W.D. Mich. 1997); MeCormiekI 134 F.R.D. at 280-83.
302Thermos Co. v. Starbucks Corp. & Pac. Mkt., Inc., No. 96-C-3833, 1998 WL 781120, at *4-5
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 1998).
303 Micron Separations, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 159 F.R.D. 361, 363, 365 (D. Mass. 1995); VLT, Inc.
v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 56, 58 (D. Mass 2002) (adopting the principle set forth in
Micron). Allowing communications relating to litigation strategy would "completely eviscerat[e] the
concept of 'subject matter' waiver and [offend] the law's mandate to construe the scope of a waiver
narrowly." McCormick1 134 F.R.D. at 282.
304 Beneficial Franchise Co. v. Bank One, N.A., 205 F.R.D. 212, 218 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
305 No. 01-C-7867, 2003 WL 1220254 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2003).
o306
Id. at *10.
307 Id.; see also Douglas Press, Inc. v. Universal Mfg. Co., No. 01-C-2565, 2003 WL 21361731,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2003) (following the reasoning of Beneficial Franchiseand Lasko, the court
held the defendant did not have to produce its trial counsel's opinion since it did not and would not
rely on the trial counsel's opinion). But see Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 224 F.R.D.
98, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (favoring a broad waiver when opinion counsel is trial counsel and a narrow
waiver when opinion counsel is independent counsel).
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faith disclosure of work product actually communicated to his client to the point
where such an order would be contemplated.
Echostar and pre-Echostar cases that found a narrow scope of waiver reason
that information obtained by opinion counsel but not made known to the accused
infringer is irrelevant to the issue of willful infringement and, thus, not discoverable
"[u]nless it can be established that the defendant knew of the factual basis for
counsel's opinion, such work product should not have to be produced." 308 As stated
the work product waiver "extends only so far as to inform the court of the infringer's
state of mind."30 9 Accordingly, Echostaralso includes within the scope of the waiver
work product that reflects communications with the accused infringer, regardless of
whether the work product itself was actually communicated to the accused
3 10
infringer.

3. Unique Scopes of Waiver
Although the majority of the courts followed one of the above two lines of cases,
and presumably will now follow the narrow scope of waiver cases in light of Echostar,
some courts have deviated in the past in ways that may still be applicable after
Echostar. These courts crafted orders for production of privileged materials on a
case-by-case basis, keeping in mind the principles of fairness, the deterrence that
arises if waiver is too broad, and the totality-of-the-circumstances standard used in
311
determining willfulness.
In American StandardInc. v. Pfizer, Inc.,312 the court found that there was no
waiver of privilege because the opinion letter was not privileged.3 13 The opinion
letter did not reveal a confidential communication. For example, the opinion letter
was not signed, it was not addressed to anyone, it did not contain a letterhead or
other indications about its source, it did not discuss any actions taken by the accused
infringer, nor did it recommend any action for the accused infringer to take. The
31 4
opinion letter "merely concludes that the ... patent is invalid."
Another court has distinguished between an opinion letter that is written to a
client of opinion counsel and a letter written to third-party customers. In Aspex
Eyewear, Inc. v. ELite Optik, Inc. 315 the accused infringer produced a letter its
opinion counsel had written to the accused infringer's customers.3 16 The nonprivileged letter explained that the accused infringer's product did not infringe the
plaintiffs patent and that in the event the customers were sued for patent
infringement, the accused infringer would indemnify them.31 7 The court found that
Nitinol Med. Techs., Inc. v. AGA Med. Corp., 135 F. Supp. 2d 212, 218 (D. Mass. 2000).
In re Echostar Comme'ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
310 Id. at 1304.
311 See Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Motor Wheel Corp., 155 F.R.D. 170, 172 (W.D. Mich. 1991); Greene
308
309

Tweed of Del., Inc. v. DuPont Dow Elastomers, L.L.C., 202 F.R.D. 418, 420 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
312 828 F.2d 734 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
313 Id. at 745-46.
314 Id. at 745.
315 No. Civ.A.3:98CV2996D, 2002 WL 1592606 (N.D. Tex. July 17, 2002).
316 Id. at *3.
317 Id.
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statements in the letter that the product did not infringe plaintiffs patent did not
reveal any work product or confidential information because opinion counsel did not
discuss the differences between the products or the file history or prior art of the
patent. Thus, the letter did not waive either the attorney-client privilege or workproduct immunity.3 18 Even if courts follow this reasoning, it is unclear whether such
a letter would be effective in defending against willful infringement because opinion
letters containing only conclusory statements without further analysis normally do
3 19
not constitute competent opinions of counsel.
Still another court formulated a different compromise between the broad and
narrow scopes of waiver. In Electro Scientific Industries,Inc. v. General Scanning,
Ine.,320 the court ordered the accused infringer to disclose some documents protected
by work-product immunity that had not been communicated to the accused infringer,
but it stated that only outside counsel for the plaintiff would have access to the
documents. 321 These documents included those relating to the analyses contained in
the opinion. Documents prepared after the filing of the lawsuit were not ordered to
be disclosed.3 22 The court would then allow outside counsel to use those materials if
the materials "lend meaningful support to an inference that [the accused infringer] in
fact received opinions or information that are materially different from the opinions
or information in the one disclosed opinion letter."3 23 This rationale struck a
compromise between the interests of the accused infringer, who claimed that it did
not have any inconsistent opinions, and the plaintiff, for whom fairness dictated a
chance to question that claim. 324 It is unlikely that Electro Scientific remains good
law after Echostar,however, as stated above, it is possible that a court's distrust of
the accused infringer's representations would warrant such an order.
Before discovery of the opinion and communications or other documents
regarding the opinion can be allowed, the accused infringer must first decide to rely
on the opinion as a defense.3 25 If an accused infringer has not indicated that it will
rely on an opinion of counsel as a defense to willful infringement or has essentially
denied that it will use such a defense, "there is no discovery to be ordered with regard
to pre-complaint opinion letters."326 The indication by the accused infringer that it
will rely on an advice-of-counsel defense also sets the bounds of discovery since the
scope of discovery depends on the identity and scope of each advice-of-counsel defense
the accused infringer raises. 327 However, accused infringers cannot wait until after

318

Id. at *4.

319 See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 829 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ('A written opinion may be

incompetent on its face by reason of its containing conclusory statements without discussion of facts
or obviously presenting only a superficial or off-the-cuff analysis.") (citing Underwater Devices, Inc.
v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
320 175 F.R.D. 539 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
321 Id.
at 546-47.
322Id.
323 Id. at 547.
324 ITd
325 In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 210 F.R.D. 43, 52-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Solaia Tech. LLC, v.

Jefferson Smurfit Corp., No. 01-C-6641, 2002 WL 1822917, at *1 (N.D. 11. Aug. 7, 2002).
326 Solaia, 2002 WL 1822917, at *2.
327
Buspirone Litig., 210 F.R.D. at 52-53.
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the discovery period to indicate their reliance on opinions of counsel. Such behavior
328
will be sanctioned by the courts without hesitation.
The cases cited above illustrate the many possible ways a court may rule on the
scope of waiver of attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity when an
advice-of-counsel defense is employed.
One reason for the broad spectrum of
outcomes is that willful infringement is determined by weighing the totality of the
circumstances, and thus, courts "fashion their orders compelling the production of
documents on a case by case basis consistent with the principles of fundamental
fairness." 329
Although Echostar answers many questions on waiver of
uncommunicated work product, the scope of the subject matter waiver and the scope
of temporal waiver remain unsettled, as does the question of whether there is a
distinction between the communications and work product of trial counsel versus
opinion counsel.

1. Bifurcation and Stay ofDiscovery as Alternatives
Although the attorney-client privilege is thought to be worthy of "maximum
legal protection," the above discussion on the waiver of privilege in willful
infringement cases shows how the privilege is often undermined.33 0 In fact, it is
recognized that the current patent litigation strategy usually follows this path:
[Tihe patent owner opens with a claim for willful infringement; the alleged
infringer answers by denying willful infringement and asserts good faith
reliance on advice of counsel as an affirmative defense; then the owner
serves contention interrogatories and document requests seeking the
factual basis for that good faith reliance defense and the production of
documents relating to counsel's opinion; the alleged infringer responds by
seeking to defer responses and a decision on disclosure of the opinion; the
owner counters by moving to compel; and the alleged infringer moves to
33 1
stay discovery and for separate trials.
It is unlikely that Knorr-Brems 32 will alter this pattern in cases where the
accused infringer has an opinion it intends to rely upon at trial. A possible effect of
Knorr-Bremse could be that judges give less consideration to bifurcation, stays of
discovery, and serial trials because the opinion holder can simply claim privilege
without suffering an adverse inference. Further, there is no longer the fear that an
adverse inference as to the content of the opinion could taint other phases of the trial,
328

Solaia, 2002 WL 1822917, at *2 (asserting that if the Court receives "any evidence that [the

defendant] was merely waiting until after the close of discovery to indicate its plan to rely on any of
its attorneys' opinions, [the Court] will not hesitate to sanction it for such behavior").
'329 Greene, Tweed of Del., Inc. v. DuPont Dow Elastomers, L.L.C., 202 F.R.D. 418, 420 (E.D.

Pa. 2001); see also Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Motor Wheels Corp., 155 F.R.D. 170, 172 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
330 Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro (Johns Hopkins 1, 160 F.R.D. 30, 34 (D. Del. 1995) (citing
Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383 (1981)).
331 Id.
332

2004).

Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir.
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such as liability. Given the convincing evidentiary weight of a competent opinion of
counsel and testimony from opinion counsel, it is foreseeable that producing an
opinion to rely upon at trial will continue to be highly desirable even in light of the
accompanying uncertain scope of waiver. Additionally, the ability of the patentee to
present evidence seeking an informal adverse inference may be present to some
degree. Thus, the accused infringer will still be faced with producing an opinion that
might reveal trial strategy for the liability phase, conflict with trial strategy, or be
otherwise problematic. Bifurcation and serial trials continue to be useful tools for
carving out and simplifying the complex, but usually separate issues of liability and
damages in patent cases. However, the general sense in the patent litigation
community, as evidenced by the amicus briefs in Knorr-Bremse, is that judges are
highly reluctant to employ the procedural devices.

1. Bifurcation of Trial
To ease the prejudice to the accused infringer when revealing privileged subject
matter in the hope of avoiding a finding of willful infringement, the Federal Circuit
has suggested that "[tirial courts thus should give serious consideration to a separate
trial on willfulness whenever the particular attorney-client communications, once
inspected by the Court in camera, reveal that the accused infringer is indeed
333
confronted with this dilemma."
Another reason given for bifurcation is that the issues of liability and damages
in patent cases, even without willfulness issues, are complex. 334 Issues such as the
335
validity of the patent often must be decided before considering damages.
"However, the mere status of being a patent case does not create a presumption or
336
inference in favor of bifurcation and separate trials."
Even though the Federal Circuit has suggested bifurcating trial when
willfulness is at issue in a patent infringement case, many courts continue to balance
the costs of bifurcation against the benefits.33 7 This trend will continue now that the
adverse inference is no longer supported in the law. Further, "the actual decision
reached in [other patent] cases is of limited value because only the specific facts and
33 F & G Scrolling Mouse, L.L.C. v. IBM Corp., 190 F.R.D. 385, 392 n.24 (M.D.N.C. 1999). It is
rare that a court will allow willfulness to be separated out by itself. Id. Rather, bifurcation in
patent cases usually separates the issues of willfulness and damages from liability. Id. at 391;
Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 644 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Fromson v. W. Litho Plate &
Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (allowing for bifurcation may reduce any prejudice
the accused infringer may have relating to disclosure of privileged information); F & G Scrolling
Mouse, 190 F.R.D. at 391.
'33 F & G Scrolling Mouse, 190 F.R.D. at 387; Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Beckman
Instruments, Inc., 180 F.R.D. 254, 256 (D.N.J. 1997).
335 Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Nat'l Castings Inc. (Amsted fl, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737, 1739 (N.D. Ill.

1990); F& G ScrollingMouse, 190 F.R.D. at 387.
336 F & G Scrolling Mouse, 190 F.R.D. at 387; see also Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
791 F. Supp. 113, 114 (E.D. La. 1992). Trying the damages issue alone can be time-consuming and
expensive. F& G ScrollingMouse, 190 F.R.D. at 387.
337 See Real v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 195 F.R.D. 618, 625 (N.D. Ill. 2000) ("Far from a mandate
to order separate trials whenever the issue of willfulness arises, the Federal Circuit advises careful
consideration and separate trials in appropriatecases, which is precisely what this Court is doing.").
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circumstances of the case before the court can provide the answer to the question of
whether the advantages of bifurcation outweigh the disadvantages. 33 8 The mere
assertion of a purported advice-of-counsel dilemma is not a sufficient showing for
bifurcation. 339
Courts "must balance the equities in ruling on a motion to
bifurcate."3 40 The extent of prejudice resulting from an advice-of-counsel defense is
not the same in each case. Rather, it "depends on the nature of the advice sought,
the information provided to obtain the advice, and the advice given pre-infringement
to the defendant." 341 Therefore, the party seeking bifurcation (usually the party
seeking to prevent waiver of attorney-client privileged materials) has the burden of
342
proving that bifurcation is preferable.
The Federal Circuit has suggested that prior to deciding whether to bifurcate
the trial, the court should first conduct an in camera inspection of the documents to
determine whether prejudice will arise if the opinion is produced before the
willfulness stage of the proceeding. 343 Court decisions range from holding that such
3 44
an inspection is mandatory to holding that the inspection is not needed.
In weighing the benefits and costs of bifurcation of the willfulness issue, the
majority of courts have decided against bifurcation, even when the accused infringer
might be prejudiced by production of the opinion before the willfulness stage. As in
345
other types of cases, bifurcation in patent cases "is the exception, not the rule."
The courts in favor of bifurcation have "shifted the focus of most bifurcation motions
in patent cases from a technique to reduce the inefficiencies in litigation by trying
issues separately to a way to minimize potential prejudice in a single trial by staying
discovery." 346 The courts refusing to bifurcate the trial often cite concerns of
347
inefficiency and prejudice that may result from delays caused by bifurcation.
Bifurcation is not allowed when the accused infringer "has not [met its] burden of
proving that the bifurcation will promote judicial economy and avoid inconvenience

338F& G ScrollingMouse, 190 F.R.D. at 387.
3" Laitram Corp., 791 F. Supp. at 117 n.2; see alsoF& G ScrollingMouse, 190 F.R.D. at 392.
340Laitrnm Corp., 791 F. Supp. at 115.
'1'

Patent Holding Co. v. TG (USA) Corp., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1566, 1568 (E.D. Mich. 1997).

342 Real, 195 F.R.D. at 620; F & G Scrolling Mouse, 190 F.R.D. at 388; IPPV Enters. v.

Cable/Home Comme'n Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1714, 1717 (S.D. Cal. 1993); Spectra-Physics Lasers, Inc.
v. Uniphase Corp., 144 F.R.D. 99, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
343 F& GScrollingMouse, 190 F.R.D. at 391; Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642,
644 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
"31See F& G ScrollingMouse, 190 F.R.D. at 392 (stating that the materials must be presented
for an in camera inspection and the extent of the prejudice shown by specific facts); NeoRx Corp. v.
Immunomedics, Inc., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1395, 1396 (D.N.J. 1993) (remanding the case for magistrate's
failure to inspect the documents in camera before ruling on bifurcation, finding this procedure
contemplated by the Quantum court); PatentHolding, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1569 (adopting the court's
suggestion to inspect the documents in camera before deciding whether bifurcation is necessary); cf
IPPV Enters., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1716 ([T]he Federal Circuit has specifically stated that such in
camera review is not required."); Home Elevators, Inc. v. Millar Elevator Serv. Co., 933 F. Supp.
1090, 1092 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (citing _PPVEnters., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1714).
34, Real, 195 F.R.D. at 620; Laitram Corp., 791 F. Supp. at 114.
346 Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro (JohnsHopkins 1), 160 F.R.D. 30, 34-35 (D. Del. 1995).
347 Spectra Physics, 144 F.R.D. at 101. When the case is tried before a judge instead of a jury,
the case for prejudice in revealing privileged information "may well be unfounded." Id.
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or prejudice to the parties." 348

Bifurcation was refused when the accused infringer

failed to show that bifurcating the trial would result in the efficiencies necessary for
the granting of such relief.349 It was also refused when willfulness was found to be

"inextricablybound to the facts underlying the alleged infringement." 350 It may also
351
be refused when the costs of bifurcation are simply too high.

One court analyzed the following factors in deciding to bifurcate the issues of
damages and liability, but not liability and willfulness: (i) the need for voluminous
documents to resolve damages; (2) complex infringement issues; (3) multiple patents,
infringing products, claims, and counterclaims; and (4) probability that defendant
would prevail on the infringement issue. 352

Since the case involved two patents,

thirteen claims, six competing defendant groups, several affirmative defenses,
thousands of highly confidential financial documents, hundreds of witnesses from
around the world, and little overlap of liability and damages, the court found
bifurcation proper as to liability and damages. 353 The court declined to bifurcate
willfulness, instead staying discovery on the opinions until after a decision on
354
dispositive liability motions.
The courts that have taken the suggestion of the Federal Circuit to bifurcate in
willful infringement cases reason that bifurcation is needed to protect against
prejudice to the alleged infringer. In Allergan, Inc. v. Pharmacia Corp.,355 the court
allowed bifurcation for willfulness because the scope of discovery could be
prejudicial. 356 Other courts allow bifurcation after weighing the various factors
usually considered by courts in bifurcation motions and finding a balance in favor of
bifurcation. 357 These courts, as distinguished from those denying bifurcation after
M8 Id.; IPPVEnter., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1717 (denying bifurcation on several grounds, including
judicial economy, the key factor in the analysis).
34) Johns Hopkins Z,160 F.R.D. at 35; Rea], 195 F.R.D. at 621-23 (denying bifurcation after
weighing the usual bifurcation factors such as efficiency and complexity of case).
350 Home Elevators, Inc. v. Millar Elevator Serv. Co., 933 F. Supp. 1090, 1092 (N.D. Ga. 1996)
(denying bifurcation due to overlap of issues and judicial economy); Nitinol Med. Techs., Inc. v. AGA
Med. Corp., 135 F. Supp. 2d 212, 216 (D. Mass. 2000) ("many courts have found that the issue of
willfulness is inextricably intertwined with issues of liability"); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. James River
Corp. of Va., 131 F.R.D. 607, 609 (N.D.Ga. 1989) (allowing bifurcation for damages issues but not
for willfulness issues since willfulness issues are "inextricably bound" to liability issues).
Bifurcation has also been refused on the basis of delay. Id. Patent Holding Co. v. TG (USA) Corp.,
46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1566, 1568 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (commenting that reconvening a second jury to
determine willfulness is "cumbersome and inefficient'); Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 791
F. Supp. 113, 117 (E.D. La. 1992) (refusing to bifurcate because one trial would be quicker); Belmont
Textile Mach. Co. v. Superba, S.A., 48 F. Supp. 2d 521, 526 (W.D.N.C. 1999), dismissed, 18 Fed.
Appx. 826 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (commenting that bifurcation would "cause greater delay and might
complicate the proceedings" while refusing bifurcation on other grounds).
351 THK Am., Inc. v. NSK Co., 151 F.R.D. 625, 632-33 (N.D. Ill. 1993). The THKcourt may

have also been influenced by the fact that the litigation was between foreign-based parties, a
situation where any delay would greatly increase the cost.
352 William Reber, L.L.C. v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 220 F.R.D. 533, 537 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
353Id.at 538-39.
354Id.at 541-42.
355 No. Civ.A.01-141-SLR, 2002 WL 1268047 (D. Del. May 17, 2002).
35 G Id. at *2.n.1.
357 Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Nat'l Castings, Inc. (Amstedhl, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737, 1739-40 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (allowing bifurcation since the plaintiff was not likely to succeed on the merits, there was not
substantial overlap in the evidence, and "prudence counsels in favor of excluding [willfulness
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weighing the same factors, often find that considerations in patent infringement
suits suggest that bifurcation would serve efficiency concerns. 35 While most courts
include willfulness in the damages phase, others include willfulness in the liability
phase. "[IB]ecause willfulness is determined from the totality of the circumstances, it
is the reason why some courts prefer to include the issue of willfulness with the
35 9
liability phase of a bifurcated trial."

2. Stay ofDiscovery
One procedure that is closely related to bifurcation of the trial is staying
discovery. Often, the accused infringer moving to bifurcate the willfulness portion of
the trial will also move to stay discovery on the documents relating to the advice-ofcounsel defense. If bifurcation is allowed, the courts will usually also allow a stay of
discovery on willfulness issues. 360 The courts often cite the same reasoning when
denying a stay of discovery as in refusing to bifurcate the trial: that a stay of
361
discovery is not an efficient solution and delays resolution of the issues.
A few courts have employed unique solutions. In Patent Holding Co. v. TG
(USA) Corp.362 the court granted defendant's motion for bifurcation of trial, but
denied defendant's motion for bifurcating discovery. 363 In Plasmanet,Inc. v. APAX
Partners,Inc., 364 the court addressed only the defendant's motion to stay discovery

evidence] unless and until" there is first a finding of liability where there is a concern of prejudice);
Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1475, 1477 (D. Or. 1991) (finding no overlap of
evidence regarding willfulness and liability issues since intent is irrelevant to the issue of
infringement liability and damages).
358 Princeton Biochemicals Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 180 F.R.D. 254, 256 (D.N.J.
1997).
3'9 THK Am., Inc. v. NSK Co., 151 F.R.D. 625, 630 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
30 See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro (JohnsHopkins 1),
160 F.R.D. 30, 33 (D. Del. 1995)
(citing several patent cases that suggest that an "incidental benefit" of bifurcation is a stay of
discovery on willfulness issues); Allergan, 2002 WL 1268047, at *2 (allowing bifurcation and a stay
of discovery for documents relating to willful infringement); Avia Group, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1477-78
(allowing stay of discovery as to enhanced damages and potential award of attorney fees); Princeton
Biochemicals, 180 F.R.D. at 260 (staying discovery for the same reasons as mentioned for
bifurcating trial). But see THK, 151 F.R.D. at 633 (denying bifurcation and stay of discovery due to
substantial overlap of evidence).
3 1 Johns Hopkins , 160 F.R.D. at 36 (finding that staying discovery on the willfulness issue
"builds difficult delays and complications into the case" and is neither a "particularly efficient or
effective solution"); Nitinol Med. Techs., Inc. v. AGA Med. Corp., 135 F. Supp. 2d 212, 215 (D. Mass.
2000) (staying of discovery will only serve to further delay the completion of already protracted
discovery); Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 791 F. Supp. 113, 117 n.2 (E.D. La. 1992)
(refusing bifurcation because of delay and inefficiency but refusing a stay of discovery because
defendant would not be prejudiced by early disclosure of information relating to the advice-ofcounsel defense since such information would "presumably support" the accused defendant's
position).
3 2 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1566 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
363 Id. at 1570.
364No. 02 Civ. 9290 BSJ THK, 2003 WL 21800981 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2003) (holding, after an in
camera review of the opinion of counsel, that "[d]isclosure of the Opinion would prejudice
[defendant] with respect to the issue of liability by revealing its attorney's thinking, strategy and
opinions," and that this outweighed any possible inefficiency).
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relating to the opinion of counsel, while noting that the other portion of defendant's
motion requesting the bifurcation of the trial rested in the discretion of the trial
judge.36 5 The court in Plasmanet may have deferred ruling on bifurcating the trial
since it had stayed discovery relating to the opinion of counsel until after a decision
3 66
on a motion for summary judgment on liability issues.
The Northern District of California's Local Patent Rule 3-8 provides that a party
relying on the advice-of-counsel defense must submit, within fifty days of the entry of
a Markman order, the opinion and all accompanying papers to which the party
agrees that attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity has been waived,
along with a privilege log of all other documents not produced that relate to the
subject matter of the opinions, except for those documents authored by trial counsel
367
acting solely as trial counsel.

3. Sequential Trial of Issues
Instead of allowing bifurcation and a stay of discovery, some courts have opted
for trying the issues in sequence, in accordance with Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 368 These courts balance a desire to minimize the confusion to the
jury if the issues of liability, damages, and willfulness are tried together with
concerns of efficiency, delay, and overlap of evidence. By hearing the issues in
phases of liability, then damages and willfulness, if needed, the court may minimize
the confusion to the jury and/or prejudice to the accused infringer, but still maintain
the convenience and benefits of one trial and one jury.36 9 Similarly, some courts have
allowed discovery in stages so that the more sensitive subjects, related to willfulness,
are set for the latter part of discovery.3 70 Doing so may help protect against
371
prejudice.
Another court adopted a hybrid of the stay of discovery and serial trial solutions
in Kos Pharmaeeutieals,Inc. v. BarrLaboratories, Inc.3 72 In Kos, the court denied
the accused infringer's motion to bifurcate, at least partly because the accused
365

Td. at 1-2.
at *3.

'366 Id.

367 The Northern District of California Local Patent Rules, http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/
CAND/LocalRul.nsf (last visited Mar. 3, 2007); see also Caliper Techs. Corp. v. Molecular Devices
Corp., 213 F.R.D. 555, 559 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (following local rules in refusing to grant motion to
compel opinions before time set out in rule).
3 8 Johns Hopkins - 160 F.R.D. at 36; see also F & G Scrolling Mouse v. IBM Corp., 190 F.R.D.
385, 390 (M.D.N.C. 1999) (commenting that "when the only justification for bifurcation is possible
jury confusion because of complexity of the issues and numerous experts, simultaneous discovery
and back-to-back trials with the same jury may be in order"); Belmont Textile Mach. v. Superba,
S.A., 48 F. Supp. 2d 521, 526 (W.D.N.C. 1999), dismissed,18 Fed. Appx. 826 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating
that the court may allow presentation of the various issues to the jury one at a time).
3 9 Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 791 F. Supp. 113, 116-17 (E.D. La 1992); see IPPV
Enters. v. Cable/Home Commc'n Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1714, 1717 (S.D. Cal. 1993) ([T]he only way
that [the court] could see to ever bifurcate would be to roll immediately into a second trial.").
370 See F & G Serolling Mouse, 190 F.R.D. at 390 (stating that courts may choose to stage
discovery as an option "between the extremes from simultaneous discovery to a stay in discovery").
371 Id.
at 391.
372 218 F.R.D. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), clarideationdenied 293 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(commenting on decision while refusing to clarify).
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product had not yet reached the market, and therefore, the patentee had not suffered
monetary damages.3i7
However, the court recognized the dilemma inherent in
waiving the privilege at an early stage as to opinions, which the accused infringer
represented as containing indications of trial strategy. 74 The court resolved the
matter by first staying discovery only with respect to the opinions, while making it
clear that discovery on all issues, including other factual discovery related to
willfulness, was to continue. 75 Second, the court ordered the serial trial of liability
and willfulness. 76 Discovery on the opinions was to occur while the jury deliberated
77
on liability and/or during a several-day break after the liability phase.
It should be noted that many judges look with disfavor on any procedures that
prolong proceedings in the trial court. These include alternative methods of
administering patent cases in order to protect privilege, which result in staged
proceedings and attendant delays.
E. In re Seagate
As mentioned above, a number of important questions remain following
Echostar. In particular, Echostar did not address whether the waiver of privilege
resulting from reliance on an advice-of-counsel defense to willfulness extends to
communications with trial counsel regarding the same subject matter. Likewise
unresolved is whether reliance on an opinion of counsel waives work product
immunity for the work product of trial counsel regarding the subject matter of that
opinion. These are two of the questions, which the Federal Circuit recently decided
to consider en banc in the In re Seagate Technology, L.L. C.matter.
Seagate arose from a petition for writ of mandamus from an order compelling
production of attorney-client communications and work product involving petitioner,
Seagate Technology, L.L.C. ("Seagate"), and its trial counsel.378 Seagate, one of the
accused infringers in a patent infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of New
York, raised an advice-of-counsel defense based on three written opinions directed to
the non-infringement, invalidity and unenforceability of the patents-in-suit. 379 These
opinions were prepared by counsel at a different law firm than Seagate's trial
counsel. It was also undisputed that opinion counsel had prepared those written
opinions separately from and was not influenced by trial counsel. 380 Nonetheless, the
magistrate judge held that the waiver of privilege resulting from the production of
those opinions extended to communications regarding the same subject matter with
Seagate's trial counsel.381 Moreover, because Seagate's alleged infringement had
373Id. at 391-93.
374Id. at 394.
'37

Id. at 395.

376Id.
377Id. at 394-95.
378Seagate Technology LLC's Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Vacate Discovery Orders Compelling Disclosure of Privileged Communications of Trail Counsel, In re Seagate Technology, L.L.C.,
(No. 06-830), 2007 WL 196403.
37) Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Comp. Corp., No. 00 Civ. 5141, slip op. at 5 (S.D.N.Y. May 28,
2004).
380Id. at 20.
381 Id. at 17.
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continued following receipt of those opinions, the waiver extended throughout the
period of alleged infringement, "including up through trial."3 8 2

Regarding trial

counsel's work product, the magistrate judge held that work product immunity had
383
been waived for any such work product that had been communicated to Seagate.
After Seagate's objections to the magistrate judge's order were denied before the
district court, Seagate filed its petition for a writ of mandamus with the Federal
Circuit.
38 4
The Federal Circuit decided sua sponte to consider Seagate's petition en banc.
The January 26, 2007 order granting en banc consideration invited additional
briefing on three questions:
(I)

Should a party's assertion of the advice of counsel defense to willful
infringement extend waiver of the attorney-client privilege to
communications with that party's trial counsel?

(2)

What is the effect of any such waiver on work-product immunity?

(3)

Given the impact of the statutory duty of care standard announced
in Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d
1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983), on the issue of waiver of attorney-client
privilege, should this court reconsider the decision in Underwater
385
Devices and the duty of care standard itself?

As of the time of this supplement, the Federal Circuit has not issued an opinion
in Seagate, but it is important to recognize the potential impact of this decision on
willfulness law and practice. Resolution of the first two Seagate questions will likely
have a substantial effect on whether future accused infringers choose to assert an
advice-of-counsel defense. A broad subject matter waiver that extends to future
communications with separate trial counsel will likely curtail assertion of the adviceof-counsel defense in many cases. At the same time, this would strengthen the
strategic value of charging willful infringement by forcing the accused infringer to
choose between the advice-of-counsel defense and a potentially-broad subject matter
waiver of privilege. The third Seagate question is more enigmatic. Some amici
curiae, including the American Bar Association, have suggested that the Federal
Circuit do away with the affirmative duty of care standard set forth in Underwater
Devices and require that willful infringement be premised on a finding of
"reprehensible conduct" in accord with the Supreme Court's punitive damages
precedent. 38 6 Such a result would have a dramatic effect on the current state of
willfulness practice by ostensibly raising the bar to establish willfulness and
removing some of the impetus to waive privilege regarding an opinion of counsel.
Regardless of the ultimate outcome, any reader facing issues related to the assertion
382 Id.
383Id.

at 15.
at 21-22.

In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., No. 06-830, slip op. at 1 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 2007).
at 1-2 (internal citations omitted).
386 See, e.g., Brief of the American Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 12,
In re Seagate Technology, L.L.C., (No. 06-830), 2007 WL 1032690.
384

385 Id.
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of an advice-of-counsel defense is advised to consult the Federal Circuit's Seagate
decision once it has issued.

V. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN LIGHT OF RECENT PRECEDENT AND PENDING
LEGISLATION

Knorr-Bremse8 7 eliminated what had become a de facto requirement of
obtaining and producing an opinion of counsel as a defense to willful infringement.
Now that the question of seeking an opinion is optional, the following considerations
are relevant to the decision of whether to incur the expense of obtaining an opinion:
the likelihood of litigation; the litigation history of both the patentee and the patent
at issue; whether the patent has been licensed previously; the importance of the
products implicated by the patent; the revenue associated with such products; and
the level of certainty that the opinion will be consistent with trial strategy and thus
useful at trial if desired.
Even after Knorr-Bremse, an accused infringer is well advised to seek and

obtain a competent opinion of counsel so as to have in its possession the best form of
defense if it is charged with willful infringement. Juries will continue to be favorably
impressed by the expert testimony of qualified, experienced, and reputable opinion
counsel. If the situation is such that the accused infringer desires frank advice and
not an opinion to be produced at trial, Knorr-Bremse certainly allows for a more
forthright discussion of possible solutions and outcomes, rather than the unequivocal
assertions required previously. Furthermore, opinions formed without the benefit of
discovery may now be withheld when they ultimately contradict trial strategy, thus
avoiding complicated problems involving impeachment of opinion counsel. Opinion
counsel may become trial counsel without ethical implications if the opinion is
withheld. Extreme care should be taken in this situation that the privilege is not
inadvertently waived (such as by unexpected testimony regarding reliance on opinion
of counsel). Knorr-Bremse may allow for the less burdensome measure of obtaining
and relying upon advice from scientists or other technicians as evidence of good-faith
attempts to avoid infringement. Such opinions may be sufficient to show good faith
by themselves or until such time as an actual opinion of counsel is desired because
the situation has become more serious (i.e., a lawsuit has been filed). However,
contradictions between the two opinions would be problematic, and patent attorneys
are in a unique position to opine upon issues such as infringement by the doctrine of
equivalents, obviousness, and unenforceability.
The realities of the situation, however, still call for an early decision as to
whether the opinion is being sought for practical advice or use in litigation. Most
accused infringers will continue to request an opinion that can be used as evidence at
trial. Accordingly, all the same requirements for unequivocal assertions regarding
noninfringement, invalidity, or unenforceability apply. The opinion should be free of
any hedging regarding uncertainties of outcome. The advice-of-counsel defense
works only if the opinion obtained is competent and the accused infringer reasonably
relies on the opinion and believes that it is not infringing another's patent rights.
387 KnorrBremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
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Although a competent opinion of counsel is one of the best defenses against willful
infringement, it comes at the cost of waiver of attorney-client privilege and, possibly,
work-product immunity. The scope of waiver of privilege that may arise from the use
of an advice-of-counsel defense is difficult to predict since the Federal Circuit has not
ruled on this issue and the district courts have not agreed on the scope of waiver.
Therefore, whenever an accused infringer obtains an opinion of counsel, it should
make sure that the opinion is competent, based on the criteria set forth by the courts,
while keeping in mind the uncertain scope of waiver of both attorney-client privilege
and work-product immunity if the opinion is produced.
The Federal Circuit stressed the continuing importance on the competence of the
opinion in Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co.3 88 The district court found
that the accused infringer never obtained a written opinion of counsel and that the
oral opinions obtained were rendered without an examination of the patent's
prosecution history or the accused device, and were thus incompetent. 389 The district
court criticized the accused infringer for relying on an opinion of counsel based on the
unproven representation of one of the accused infringer's employees that the
invention had been around for twenty to thirty years. 390 The district court found that
the opinions were "to be used only as an illusory shield against a later charge of
willful infringement, rather than in a good faith attempt to avoid infringing another's
patent."3 91 The accused infringer argued that it was improper for the district court to
draw negative implications about the opinion, and sought to have opinion-related
evidence ignored entirely.3 92 The accused infringer also challenged the district
3 93
court's willfulness finding because its conduct was not "reckless."
The Federal Circuit rejected both of the accused infringer's arguments. In
rejecting the first argument, the court found that if the privilege is not asserted as to
the opinion, the patentee in making its threshold showing of culpable conduct is free
to introduce as evidence whatever opinions were obtained and to challenge the
competence of those opinions in satisfaction of the patentee's burden on willfulness,
and that nothing in Knorr-Bremse precludes a patentee from attempting to make
such a showing. 394 The Federal Circuit did not shy away from the "reckless" standard
advanced by the accused infringer in its second argument, but rather identified
numerous failures to exercise due care to avoid infringement and found that the
evidence supported a finding of reckless conduct. 395 As stated earlier, the Federal
Circuit has never defined the level of culpability required for a finding of willfulness,
instead concluding it was a "question of degree." 396 It may be that the Federal
Circuit is inching towards a stricter standard for willfulness such as the
388
38

438 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1366.

'390 Id.
391

Id. at 1367.

393Id.
394 Id. at 1369. The court also cited nCube Corp. v. Seachange Intl, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1320
(Fed. Cir. 2006), where it affirmed the denial of a motion for JMOL where infringer received notice
of the patent when suit was filed and obtained an incompetent opinion upon which the infringer
relied in continuing to infringe.
39 Id. at 1370.
396 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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"reprehensible conduct" standard urged by Judge Dyk in his Knorr-Bremse dissent.
The third question posed by the Federal Circuit in Seagate may be an indication that
the court is considering moving away from the affirmative duty of care to a more
397
stringent "reprehensible conduct" standard.
A significant question that Knorr-Bremse left unanswered is-should the jury
hear whether an opinion was sought when weighing the totality of the
circumstances? In Imonex Services, Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner
GmbH,398 the Federal Circuit indicated that the jury may consider whether an
opinion obtained "years" after the accused infringer arguably had notice of the patent
satisfies the duty of care. Accordingly, once the privilege is waived with respect to
the opinion of counsel, full discovery and presentation of evidence of when it was
obtained are fair. The court stated that, while an earlier receipt of legal advice might
have strengthened the accused infringer's argument that it did not willfully infringe,
the failure to have solicited such advice did not give rise to an inference of
willfulness. 399 Nevertheless, the jury apparently heard evidence of when the opinion
was obtained in relation to when the accused infringer had notice of the patent.
Therefore, if an opinion is obtained too late, an accused infringer, after KnorrBremse, may be better off claiming privilege rather than producing the opinion, since
production opens the door for the jury to weigh the reasonableness of the time when
the opinion was obtained. Obviously, patentees would like the fact finder to reach an
informal adverse inference based on the fact that an attorney was not consulted or
the opinion was withheld. Only time will tell on this particular issue, as motions in
limine and the like are ruled upon.
A district court confronting the willfulness issue made the interesting
observation that the Knorr-Bremse court did not say that it was improper for a jury
to infer from an infringer's failure to consult counsel that the infringer had no prior
knowledge of its opponent's patents or that it had not acted properly in other
respects. 400 This statement apparently means that the jury is not precluded from
considering when the accused infringer had notice of the patent even when the
accused infringer does not obtain an opinion or claims privilege and withholds the
opinion.
After Echostar, and in view of Seagate, practitioners should be extremely
cautious when documenting communications with the client when preparing an
opinion of counsel, but may now act with more freedom when documenting their
opinions and mental impressions in preparing an opinion. Furthermore, since it is
now entirely possible that all opinions on validity, enforceability, and infringement
will be waived, only favorable opinions should be communicated to the client. To the
extent possible, all such opinions should be consistent with trial strategy. While the
Federal Circuit's resolution of the Seagate matter may ultimately reduce the risks
and difficulties resulting from assertion of an advice-of-counsel defense, the best
practice at least for now is to adopt a cautious strategy regarding client
communications. Trial counsel should carefully avoid any communications with the
client that could be characterized as an opinion on infringement, validity, or
See supra Sec. 4(E).
041262, 04-1290, 2005 WL 1204855, at *2-3 (Fed. Cir. May 23, 2005).
39 Id. at *3.
400 Third Wave Techs., Inc. v. Stratagene Corp., 405 F. Supp. 2d 991, 998 (W.D. Wisc. 2005).
397

398 No.
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enforceability and focus on communications in the vein of trial preparation, including
after the filing of suit. Before waiving the privilege, practitioners could consider
asking the court for a prospective ruling on the scope of the waiver. At the very least,
counsel should attempt to project such a ruling on the documents and
communications in existence at the time of the waiver before electing to rely on an
opinion. Counsel should further bear in mind that the waiver may be continuing
when communicating with a client after the decision has been made to rely on an
opinion.
Sweeping changes to the patent statutes are possible in the future, and the law
of willful infringement is no exception. On April 18, 2007, a bipartisan bill titled
"Patent Reform Act of 2007" was introduced in both the United States Senate and
House of Representatives. One of the many changes proposed in that bill is to amend
Paragraph 2 of 35 U.S.C. § 284 to read as follows:
b) Willful Infringement.
(1) Increased damages. A court that has determined that the infringer
has willfully infringed a patent or patents may increase the damages
up to three times the amount of damages found or assessed under
subsection (a), except that increased damages under this paragraph
shall not apply to provisional rights under section 154(d).
(2) Permitted grounds for willfulness. A court may find that an
infringer has willfully infringed a patent only if the patent owner
presents clear and convincing evidence that(A) after receiving written notice from the patentee(i) alleging acts of infringement in a manner sufficient to give
the infringer an objectively reasonable apprehension of suit
on such patent, and
(ii) identifying with particularity each claim of the patent,
each product or process that the patent owner alleges
infringes the patent, and the relationship of such product or
process to such claim, the infringer, after a reasonable
opportunity to investigate, thereafter performed one or more
of the alleged acts of infringement;
(B) the infringer intentionally copied the patented invention with
knowledge that it was patented; or
(C) after having been found by a court to have infringed that
patent, the infringer engaged in conduct that was not colorably
different from the conduct previously found to have infringed the
patent, and which resulted in a separate finding of infringement of
the same patent.
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(3) Limitations on willfulness.
(A) A court may not find that an infringer has willfully infringed a
patent under paragraph (2) for any period of time during which
the infringer had an informed good faith belief that the patent was
invalid or unenforceable, or would not be infringed by the conduct
later shown to constitute infringement of the patent.
(B) An informed good faith belief within the
subparagraph (A) may be established by-

meaning of

(i) reasonable reliance on advice of counsel;
(ii) evidence that the infringer sought to modify its conduct to
avoid infringement once it had discovered the patent; or
(iii) other evidence a court may find sufficient to establish
such good faith belief.
(C) The decision of the infringer not to present evidence of advice
of counsel is not relevant to a determination of willful
infringement under paragraph (2).
(4) Limitation on pleading.
Before the date on which a court
determines that the patent in suit is not invalid, is enforceable, and
has been infringed by the infringer, a patentee may not plead and a
court may not determine that an infringer has willfully infringed a
patent. The court's determination of an infringer's willfulness shall be
401
made without a jury.
These proposed changes to 35 U.S.C. § 284 reflect the desire of many patent
practitioners to raise the level of egregious conduct necessary to suggest willfulness
and simplify the law of willful infringement.
Currently there is significant debate within the courts as to what
circumstances are sufficient to trigger the duty of care, what constitutes a
competent opinion of counsel, when reliance on the opinion is reasonable, what
scope of attorney-client privilege and work-product waiver is appropriate in light
of Echostar, and whether the adverse inference is truly dead after Knorr-Bremse.
The currently-pending Seagate matter is a prime example of this debate.
Regardless of the outcome in Seagate and the proposed legislative changes,
willful infringement will likely continue to be an important and complicated
aspect of all patent infringement suits.

401

H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007).

